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PROSECUTORS "DOING JUSTICE" THROUGH OSMOSISREMINDERS TO ENCOURAGE A CULTURE OF COOPERATION

Melanie D. Wilson*
A cooperating defendant1 can be an invaluable source of insider information
about unsolved crimes and unidentified criminals. For instance, in June 2007, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that it had foiled a terrorist plot to bomb a
fuel pipeline supplying the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York
based on assistance from a "cooperating," convicted drug dealer.2 The cooperator
had been convicted in a New York state court.3 Subsequently, he agreed to pose as
a terrorist and infiltrate a group suspected of developing the terrorist plan directed
at JFK. The men composing the suspected terrorist group were ultimately charged
in a federal district court in New York. According to news reports of the drug
dealer's assistance to authorities, the cooperating defendant traveled overseas,
including to Trinidad, where he met with the suspected terrorists and pretended to
help in plotting the explosions. 4 He then reported surreptitiously to agents of the
FBI about the progress of the plan. The drug dealer agreed to the risky task of
infiltrating the terrorist group and, correspondingly, to provide the FBI with inside
information about the group's activities because, like the typical cooperating
defendant, he hoped to reduce the severity and length of his sentence for his

* Associate Professor, the University of Kansas School of Law; former assistant United States attorney
(1999-2005); J.D., the University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank Christopher R. Drahozal, David
J. Gottlieb, Michael B. Kent, Jr., Thomas G. Stacy, Stephen J. Ware, and the participants of a faculty workshop at
the University of Cincinnati College of Law for their helpful commentgon a prior draft of this Article. I also thank
Ted Cassert and Tammy Steinle for their research assistance and L. Michele Reeves for her ever-present support.
0 2008, Melanie Wilson.
1. In this Article, the term "cooperating defendant" includes persons charged (or targeted to be charged) with a
federal crime, or those already convicted, who offer information or testify in an effort to assist the government in
the prosecution of another crime or criminal. Cooperating defendants offer such assistance in hopes of gaining
some leniency from the government on the charges they face. The idea, of course, is to enter into an agreement in
which one defendant agrees to "trade information and testimony, with the promise of enabling the [government]
to make a case against other defendants who, for one reason or another, are regarded as most deserving of the
severest form of prosecution." Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L.
Rev. 1, 1 (1992) (citations omitted).
2. Cara Buckley & William K. Rashbaum, 4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and
FuelLines, N.Y. TIMms, June 3, 2007, at 37; Larry McShane, FederalAuthoritiesSay Informant's Role Crucialin
Exposing New York City AirportPlot, AsSOCIATED PRESS, June 4, 2007.
3. In fact, recent accounts of the informant's criminal past suggest that his criminal history is extensive and that
he has cooperated and received leniency before. Samantha Gross, Court Documents Detail History of Kennedy
Airport TerrorismPlot Informant, AssociATED PREss, June 14, 2007 (reporting that court documents indicate that
the informant had substantially assisted the government in 1996 and received a seven-year prison sentence for a
crime for which the sentencing guidelines normally called for twenty-seven years).
4. McShane, supranote 2.
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state-court drug conviction.
Commenting on why the FBI would rely on a convicted drug dealer for such an
important mission, a former member of the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorist Task6Force
explained: "In most cases, you can't get from A to B without an informant.",
Given the potential importance of cooperation, one might assume that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and federal prosecutors 7 employ systematic methods
to attract and process such tips and that prosecutors always pursue a cooperator's
lead. Although there is no specific, scientific data to show how DOJ receives or
handles information from cooperating defendants or to measure how aggressively
prosecutors pursue cooperation, 8 the empirical evidence suggests that prosecutors
could make more effective and more equitable uses of these important tips.9 The
limited data indicates that valuable cooperation is underutilized by the DOJ and
5. Gross, supra note 3.
6. McShane, supra note 2 (quoting Tom Corrigan); see also Carol Eisenberg, Kennedy Airport, NEWSDAY,
June 10, 2007, at A 16 (discussing the use of informants in solving terror plots, including frustration of the Herald
Square Subway bombing and quoting a former assistant U.S. attorney, who prosecuted the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, as saying: "When we have human intelligence, we can stop things before they happen").
7. The scope of this Article is confined to the federal system of criminal justice in recognition of the differences
in the way federal and state systems undertake prosecutions and the use of cooperating witnesses. See Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIcs 309, 353 n.235 (2001) [hereinafter
Gershman, Duty to Truth] (noting the differences in various prosecutors' offices and the lack of discussion on the
differences between state and federal prosecutors); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
FederalProsecutors,88 GEO. L.J. 207, 216 (2000) (recognizing that "federal prosecutors have long considered
themselves unique" and that "federal prosecutors have always seemed different than state prosecutors"); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors:Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 920 n. 11 (1999) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky, Cooperation](noting the "[s]triking differences
between state and federal systems," including differences in investigatory resources and types of crimes
prosecuted). Nevertheless, the basic concepts presented in this Article apply to all prosecutors (federal and state)
who strive tomaximize the benefits of information gleaned from cooperating defendants.
8. See Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supranote 7, at 919-20 (explaining that analyzing how prosecutors deal with
cooperators "does not lend itself to traditional methods of scholarly study" and that "[bly its nature, dealing with
cooperators is dependent on a constellation of factors whose impact on the process is extremely difficult to
analyze"); LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JoHN H. KRAMER, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COAMISSION, SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL PoLIcY AND PRACTICE 6 (Jan.

1998), http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf [hereinafter MAXFIELD & KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE]
(noting that when a Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group studied substantial assistance practices in the
United States attorneys' offices, the group learned that the DOJ did not maintain such information and that the
U.S. attorney's offices did not keep the information in a consistent, usable form).
9. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, SUBSTANIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 8, at 7-9 (finding inconsistencies in the
U.S. attorneys' office policies on substantial assistance departures, and also finding that while roughly sixty-eight
percent of defendants provided assistance to the government in some form, only about thirty-nine percent
received a substantial assistance departure); see also Memorandum from Linda Drazga Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n Office of Policy Analysis, to Judge Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, on Numbers in
Post-Boooker Sentencings: Data Extract on April 5, 2005 (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
sccases/Booker_041305.pdf [hereinafter Maxfield Memo] (reporting post-Booker sentencing statistics, including a finding that in only 15.2% of cases, defendants received a government sponsored 5KI.1 sentence reduction
for substantial assistance to the government); Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 569, 570, 603-22 (1998) (discussing the
disparities in the way the District of Connecticut and the District of Massachusetts promoted sentencing
departures).
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that prosecutors within the Department can improve their consistent and vigilant
use of credible cooperating defendants and the important information that such
cooperators sometimes provide.
This Article posits that although federal prosecutors are shielded from any legal
duty to pursue such leads, they always bear a separate duty to thoroughly and
thoughtfully evaluate a cooperating defendant's information. This duty to carefully
consider every cooperator's tip arises from a prosecutor's unique ethical obligation
to "do justice. ' The prosecutor's duty of justice requires careful consideration of
seemingly valid tips because of the potential importance of the information to
crime prevention and successful prosecution and because Congress has mandated
that prosecutors seek equitable and proportional sentences for all defendants."
Prosecutors must, therefore, act on all tips when action is required to fulfill the
expressed mission 12 of the DOJ, which includes the goal of "ensuring the fair and
impartial administration of justice for all Americans," and when pursuit of such
information assists the prosecutor in carrying out the demand for sentencing
13
fairness and uniformity expressed by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act.
The DOJ can foster a federal prosecutor's desire and ability to discharge this
ethical obligation to assess cooperators and their corresponding information by
creating a culture in which prosecutors are motivated and rewarded for thoughtfully evaluating such witnesses and for pursuing or rejecting such information
equitably and effectively. DOJ should also encourage prosecutors to remain open
to discussing the potential value of a cooperator's information with crime victims
and sentencing judges. Such conversations will encourage prosecutors to take into
account the value of victims' rights and Congress's sentencing goals when
assessing cooperation in a given case.
This Article develops in five parts. Part I discusses the importance of cooperation to an effective criminal justice system. Part II examines the competing
interests federal prosecutors often confront when deciding whether or not to follow
a cooperator's lead and the sentencing inequity and the underutilization of valuable

10. This ethical obligation that I contend is imposed on every federal prosecutor as part of her duty to "do
justice" might be viewed as part of the prosecutor's general ethical "duty to truth" espoused by Bennet Gershman.
Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 314.
11. See discussion infra at Part IV.
12. The DOJ's Mission includes a responsibility "to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United
States according to the law; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just
punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior;... and to ensure fair and impartial administration ofjustice for
all Americans." DOJ.gov, About the DOJ - Mission Statement and Statutory Authority, http://www.usdoj.gov/
02organizations (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
13. Although not in the context of dealing with cooperating defendants, Bennett Gershman touched on this
affirmative obligation in his article exploring the prosecutor's legal and ethical duty "to promote truth and to
refrain from conduct that impedes truth." Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 313. As Gershman
recognized, "the prosecutor has the overriding responsibility not simply to convict the guilty but to protect the
innocent." Id. at 314. The ideal of protecting innocent defendants may be furthered by ensuring that the guilty are
prosecuted.
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cooperation that can result from prosecutors' unguided evaluation of cooperating
defendants. Part I outlines the federal prosecutor's ethical obligations and the
general duty to "do justice" in her role as "minister of justice," and it discusses the
ambiguous nature of the duty in the context of dealing with defendants who seek to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of other persons and crimes. Part Ill also
addresses the impact of a prosecutor's expansive discretion on her duty to "seek
justice." Part IV explores the parameters of the federal prosecutor's duty to
adequately assess every cooperator's tip, given the value such tips can have in
preventing and solving crimes and in ensuring that guilty defendants receive
adequate, proportional punishment. Finally, Part V offers some thoughts on how a
"culture of cooperation" can foster an individual prosecutor's ability to fulfill her
ethical and professional responsibility to "do justice." In addition, Part V offers
some practical suggestions to increase the positive pressures on and incentives for
every federal prosecutor to make the most thoughtful and well-informed decisions
about accepting or rejecting cooperation.
I. THE

GOVERNMENT'S RELIANCE ON COOPERATION

Although news reports and court cases are full of instances in which the
government used a cooperating defendant's information to prevent, solve or
successfully prosecute a crime, relatively few federal defendants are rewarded at
sentencing for their efforts to assist the government in the prosecution of other
crimes or persons. The 1999 U.S. Sentencing Commission's report to the Judicial
Conference revealed that between 1995 and 1998, no more than twenty percent of
defendants received a sentencing departure based on his or her substantial efforts
to assist the government. 14 A more recent report of the Commission from 2005
found that only 15.2% of federal defendants received a 5Kl.1 sentence reduction
based on his or her assistance to the government. 15 Thus, while cooperation is an
important law enforcement tool, it is used or, at least, rewarded in a small minority
of cases, suggesting that prosecutors underutilize cooperation.
A. The Importance of Cooperation
The value of untapped cooperation is immeasurable, but the impact of coopera-

14. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 4 (Sept. 1999), available
at www.ussc.gov/publicat/judcn999.pdf [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].

15. Maxfield Memo, supranote 9. A 5Kl.1 sentence reduction is a reduction expressly authorized in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. See U.S. SENTENCING GuiDELINEs MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002). The 5K1.1 provision
allows that "[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines." Id. Provided the prosecutor files the necessary motion, the amount of the reduction is left to the
sentencing judge. Id.
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16
tors and "snitches" on reducing and preventing crime is well documented.
Kendall Coffey recently compiled examples of some of the more famous cases
successfully prosecuted with cooperating defendants, including the following: 1) a
case in which Sammy "the Bull" Gravano helped convict "Teflon Don" John Gotti;
2) the trial of Martha Stewart in which Douglas Fanueil testified in exchange for "a
sweetheart deal;" 3) the "Enron" case in which Andrew Fastow, former chief
financial officer, testified against Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay. 17 The cases in
which the government relied on cooperating witnesses to successfully prevent or
prosecute crimes are too numerous to list. 18 Recently, albeit in the specific context
of addressing international terrorism and the gathering of foreign intelligence
information, the DOJ touted the potential significance of cooperators' information
to crime prevention. In a memorandum dated January 10, 2007, Deputy Attorney
General Paul J. McNulty reminded federal prosecutors that criminal defendants
are potentially rich sources of valuable "f[oreign] i[ntelligence] information that
may prove critical to thwarting terrorist attacks, espionage, sabotage, and other
threats to our national security." 1 9 Testifying before the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security in 2005, former Assistant Attorney
General Christopher A. Wray proclaimed that "[c]ooperation agreements are an

16. See, e.g., United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "our criminal
justice system could not adequately function without information provided by informants").
17. Kendall Coffey, Milestones in Cooperation, 189 N.J.L.J. 587 (Aug. 10, 2007).
18. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, Police Informer In Terror Trial Takes Stand, N.Y TtMES, at BI (Apr. 25,
2006) (reporting how a paid informant tape recorded a twenty-three-year-old Pakistani immigrant suspected of
planning to bomb the Herald Square Subway Station); Gary Mihoces, Man in Vick Case Makes Plea Deal:
Co-defendant Taylor alleges dogfightingfunded chiefly by QB, USA TODAY, at C1 (July 31, 2007) (reporting that
former Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael Vick's co-defendant in a case alleging crimes arising from dog
fighting had decided to cooperate with the government authorities); Rudolph Bush, Man Gets 18 Years in 1997
Killing: Ex-gang member had helped prosecutors, Cm. TanB. at B3 (Apr. 10, 2006) (reporting that a teenage,
former gang member of the Latin Kings gang became a key cooperating witness and helped authorities devastate
another gang); George Anastasia; FormerPhiladelphiaMob Boss Gets 13-year Sentence, KNIGHT RIDDER, (Jan.
22, 2005) (reporting that former Philadelphia mob boss Ralph Natale received a reduced sentence after
cooperating with federal authorities in the prosecution of a series of cases, including former Camden, New Jersey
Mayor Milton Milan and mob leader Joseph "Skinny Joey" Merlino).
Questionable and even totally unfounded tips can prove important in solving crimes. For. instance, following a
homicide in Richmond, Virginia in April 2007, law enforcement officers found a note in a police car at the scene
of the crime. See Kristen Gelineau, Richmond, Virginia Says 'Enough IsEnough," AssOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 6,
2007). The note, which was unsigned, claimed to identify the killer. The note represents one of a growing number
of tips provided to police by citizens of Richmond. The tips, which are often anonymous, have been credited with
identifying numerous criminal wrongdoers. As a result of this type of citizen involvement in its criminal justice
system, Richmond experienced a "remarkable drop" in its crime during the first three months of 2007. Compare
Richmond's success story with New Jersey's struggles against increased and unsolved crimes because witnesses
are unwilling to report what they see. David Kocieniewski, A Little Girl Shot, and a Crowd That Didn'tSee, N.Y.
TIMEs, at AI (July 9, 2007) (describing how a man shot a seven-year-old girl, knocking her off her bicycle, as at
least twenty people watched, but no one would admit to seeing the shooter).
19. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors on Incentives for
Subjects and Targets of Criminal Investigations and Defendants in Criminal Cases to Provide Foreign Intelligence
Information 6 (Jan. 10, 2007) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousafoiareading-roonlusamltitle9/
crm00792.htm [beteinafter McNulty Memo].
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essential component of law enforcement and are necessary to penetrate criminal
organizations and to obtain convictions in court."" Wray further told the committee that crimes such as drug trafficking, gangs, corporate fraud and terrorism
offenses would be difficult, if not impossible, to adequately investigate without
cooperators. 2" Thus, in some contexts, the DOJ has expressly acknowledged the
need to encourage cooperation.
B. The Critics of Cooperation
Law professors and other commentators have often criticized the government's
generous use of "cooperating defendants," "informants," and "snitches." These
detractors typically emphasize the risk of wrongful convictions that can accompany reliance on a cooperating defendant's information, while downplaying the
benefits that such "snitches" can provide. 2 For instance, in claiming that the use of
"snitch witnesses" can "[o]ccasionally ... result in dramatic miscarriages of
justice[,]" George C. Harris cites the book, "Actual Innocence," which details the
story of Ron Williamson, a man convicted of murder who was eventually freed by
exonerating DNA evidence.2 3 Other commentators have, similarly, maintained that
"there is an inherently high risk that cooperating witnesses will testify falsely and
will be believed by juries, thus resulting in convictions of the innocent. ,' 24 Such
legal commentators usually express particular skepticism at the way federal
prosecutors prepare the cooperating witnesses to testify at trial. 25
The core of the criticism rests with the claim that prosecutors or their investigative agents act unethically, unprofessionally, or otherwise inappropriately in

20. Implications of the Booker/FanFan decisionsfor the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,and HomelandSecurity of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,108th Cong. 13 (2005)
(statement of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Comment, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006) [hereinafter Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable] (citing
studies on wrongful convictions "traced" to "false informant testimony").
23. George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2
(2000) (citing Jim DwYER, PETER NEuFinLD & BARRY SCHECK, AcuAL INNocENCE (2000)).
24. Sam Roberts, Note, Should ProsecutorsBe Requiredto Record TheirPretrialInterviews With Accomplices
and Snitches?,74 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 260 (2005) (footnotes omitted); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching:
The Institutionaland Communal Consequences,73 U. CN. L. REv. 645,664 n.85 (2004) (citing numerous studies
documenting wrongful convictions in which cooperators testified).
25. See Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of EthicalRules Can Minimize the
Dangers of ProsecutorialLeniency and Immunity Deals, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 875, 884 (2002) ("[W]hen a
prosecutor tells a defendant or defense counsel what testimony is expected of the defendant.., in order to qualify
for cooperator/leniency/immunity status, the defendant is powerfully motivated to parrot what the prosecution
wants and expects to hear."); Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors,23 CARDozo L. REv. 829,
848 (2002) (stating that the dynamics of the preparation process allow cooperating witnesses to be "able to present
[their] testimony to the jury in a truthful and convincing manner"); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Soft Words of
Hope: Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129, 1140
(2004) [hereinafter Cassidy, Soft Words] ("Not only do accomplice witnesses have a motive to fabricate, they have
an ability to fabricate and to fabricate convincingly.").
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communicating with cooperating witnesses. On this point, Professor Alexandra
Natapoff asserts that "informants do not generate wrongful convictions merely
because they lie. After all, lying hardly distinguishes informants from other sorts of
witnesses. Rather, it is how and why they lie, and how the government depends on
lying informants, that makes snitching a troubling distortion of the truth-seeking
process.",26 Natapoff's criticism continues: "[p]olice and prosecutors are heavily
invested in using informants to conduct investigations and to make their cases. ' 27
Natapoff claims that as a result of prosecutors' interest in using informants, "they
often lack the objectivity and the information that would permit them to discern
when informants are lying.",28 Natapoff concludes: "This gives rise to a disturbing
marriage of convenience: both snitches and the government benefit from
inculpa29
tory information while neither has a strong incentive to challenge it."
These critics express valid concerns. The risks of relying on biased, cooperating
witnesses are well documented. The criticisms are especially convincing when
they are properly directed at the inadequately trained, inexperienced prosecutor
and the occasional, bumbling, unethical or overzealous prosecutor. But the
condemnation of prosecutors' use of cooperating witnesses generally is undeserved. There is no doubt that the use of a cooperator's information creates a
danger of false testimony and, correspondingly, wrongful convictions. But, false
testimony and wrongful convictions are not unique to trials involving cooperating
witnesses. Erroneous testimony and convictions of the innocent also result from
inaccurate eye-witness identifications, even when witnesses have the purest of
motives.3 ° In fact, there are several documented reasons for erroneous trial results,
including: ineffective assistance of counsel, coerced or false confessions, inaccurate child testimony, and the accidental (or even intentional) mishandling of
forensic evidence, to name a few. 31 Also, there are powerful checks in place to

26. Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable,supra note 22, at 108.
27. Id. at 108 & n.6 (citing Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutionaland Communal Consequences, 73
U. CiN. L. REv. 645,652 (2004)).
28. Id. at 108 & n.7 (citing Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supra note 7, at 945 (1999)).

29. Id. at 108.
30. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL., 277, 278 (2003)
(asserting that of the 100 convicted persons exonerated by DNA testing, seventy-five percent were victims of
mistaken eye-witness testimony); see also Gershman, supra note 7 at 313 & n.14 (discussing numerous
documented reasons leading to wrongful convictions, including: coerced or false confessions, inaccurate child
testimony, misidentification, prosecutorial misconduct, etc.).
31. Gershman, supranote 7 at 313; see also The Innocence Project.org, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand (last visited Jan. 15, 2008) (citing eyewitness misidentification,
unreliable science, false confessions, misconduct by the government, and "bad lawyering" as causes of wrongful
conviction in addition to informant/snitch testimony); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:It Is Time to Take
ProsecutionDisciplineSeriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 275, 285 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct's
role in wrongful convictions but acknowledging that at least one study has found that "bad lawyering" is a factor
in thirty-two percent of wrongful convictions and that police misconduct also accounts for about fifty-percent of
wrongful convictions); Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving

Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 265, 272 (2004) (noting
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reduce the risks that the critics identify, including: 1) cross examination of the
cooperator to expose bias and inconsistencies; 2) jury evaluation of the cooperator's testimony for credibility; 3) the prosecutor's legal obligations under Brady v.
Maryland32 and Giglio v. United States 33 to disclose favorable information to the
defense; and 4) the right to effective assistance of counsel.34 Not only do the
criticisms about cooperating witnesses overlook the many other reasons for
wrongful convictions, 3 5 but the critical analyses also unduly minimize the benefits
cooperating witnesses bring to crime resolution, so long as prosecutors comply
with their ethical duty-to seek justice-when dealing with such witnesses.
Without encouraging criminals who have information about other crimes to
come forward and reveal information, many guilty and some incredibly dangerous
people would remain unhindered in pursuing new crimes and victimizing lawabiding people. Furthermore, even accepting the critics' concerns about the use of
cooperation, prosecutors will continue to use cooperation, at least sometimes, so
prosecutors will need to decide how to make a smart and an equitable use of the
information. Even the critics do not call for a categorical ban of all information
provided by cooperators. 3 6 The key, of course, is for prosecutors to investigate,
corroborate,37 and use informants only when it is ethically and professionally
responsible to do so and always when "doing justice" requires.3 8
II. THE

COMPETING VALUES OF COOPERATION AND PROSECUTORS'
DISPARATE USE OF IT

A prosecutor's decision to use a cooperating defendant can be anything but
straightforward. In deciding whether or not to pursue a tip, the prosecutor must
numerous flaws in the criminal justice system that may lead to a wrongful conviction, including unreliable
eye-witness testimony, perjured testimony by "jailhouse snitches," false confessions, "junk" science, government
misconduct and incompetent lawyers).
32. 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
33. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that prosecutors must provide impeachment evidence to the defense).
34. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35. A full analysis of the risks of cooperation and the off-setting checks on those risks is beyond the scope of
this Article.
36. For instance, Professor Natapoff supports a pretrial reliability hearing for cooperating witnesses. See
Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, supra note 22, at 126 ("[I]t is appropriate to hold a hearing to establish the
reliability of the witnesses through adversarial questioning and a neutral evaluation by the Court.").
37. See Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supra note 7, at 932 (noting that former assistant U.S. attorneys emphasize
that corroboration of facts provided by cooperators is "the key factor" in assuring cooperators' truthfulness); see
also R. Michael Cassidy, Characterand Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor'sEthical
Duty to "Seek Justice," 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 635, 659 (2006) [hereinafter Cassidy, Characterand Context]
(asserting that every decision on whether to "flip" a co-defendant requires a contextual assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of the case and a determination of whether the accomplice's testimony can be corroborated,
among other considerations).
38. This Article recognizes that these criteria for the appropriate use of cooperators create a nebulous standard.
The amorphous concept is discussed in more depth infra Part Ill.B.1.
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balance numerous, often competing, interests. If one prosecutor balances the
interests differently than his next-door neighbor, disparity and sometimes inequity
results in the way crimes are prosecuted and the manner in which similarlysituated defendants are treated.
In spite of DOJ's acknowledgement of the potential importance of information
received through cooperation, as expressed by Mr. McNulty's recent memo to
prosecutors and Mr. Wray's previous testimony before Congress, the Department's
attention to cooperation has been neither consistent nor standardized. There are
insufficient procedures and policies in place to adequately guide assistant U.S.
attorneys who frequently deal with cooperators.3 9 There is little official written
guidance on the topic. And while training is available to assistant U.S. attorneys
about how to deal with cooperation, the training is not mandatory. 40 As a result of
this inconsistent message from the DOJ about the value and use of cooperating
defendants, prosecutors' use of cooperation is inconsistent.
A. The Difficulty ProsecutorsFace in FairlyAssessing the Competing Interests
Inherent in an Offer of Cooperation
Consider the following hypothetical scenario.4 1 While sitting in her office, a
seasoned federal prosecutor ("Lisa") hears the familiar chime of the computer,
indicating that she has received a new email message. Instinctively, she checks the
subject-matter line and sender identity. Lisa sees that she has received an
intra-office, district-wide email from another prosecutor ("Steven") who is new to
the office and to prosecuting cases. In his email, Steven asks who is responsible for
the prosecution of Defendant Tom Smith. Because Lisa is assigned to prosecute
Smith for a recent bank robbery in the district, she opens the email and reads
further. Steven says that "his" Defendant, Jones, claims to have important
information about additional crimes committed by Smith.42 Steven reports that
Jones was a significant participant in an interstate drug ring. Evidence also
suggests that Jones and several others bought and sold unlawful, automatic
weapons, and that the group sometimes engaged in physical violence, including
39. See discussion infra at Part II.C.
40. There are a variety of training opportunities available to assistant U.S. attorneys at a National District
Attorneys Association (NDAA) facility in Columbia, South Carolina, which is designed especially for training
federal lawyers. See NDAA.org, NDAA Training at the National Advocacy Center, www.ndaa.org/education/
nacindex.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (describing the National Advocacy Center, the centralized facility for
all federal prosecutors). The individual U.S. Attorneys sometimes encourage or require attendance for certain
training, however, there is no DOJ-wide mandate. Although the DOJ does require yearly ethics training, the
training does not focus on the use of cooperating witnesses. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2638.704 (2008) (mandating
yearly training for persons required to file public financial disclosure reports).
41. This is a fictional account created by this author to demonstrate the difficulty federal prosecutors
sometimes confront when fulfilling their duty to carefully and thoughtfully assess the pros and cons of
cooperation. while fictional, the scenario is based on the author's experiences as a former assistant U.S. attorney.
42. The names of the prosecutors and the defendants have no relation to an actual case and were chosen merely
to make a point.
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several violent assaults on rival drug dealers. Jones now wants to "cooperate" with
authorities and provide "substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution
of Smith" 43 for Smith's other crimes, in hopes of earning a reduction in the length
and severity of his own sentence. 44
Concerned that Smith receive the punishment he is due for all the crimes he has
committed, Lisa arranges an interview 45 with Defendant Jones during which Lisa
(and the FBI agent assigned to aid in the prosecution of Smith) learns about
Smith's other crimes. During the interview, Jones claims to know about four
additional bank robberies Smith committed and provides details of each robbery,
which are not publicly known. Jones also says that Smith has raped several women
and that Smith molested and then attempted to murder a young child. Two of the
bank robberies Jones discusses are unsolved crimes in Lisa's own district. The
other two were committed outside the district. The rapes and the attack on the child
are state crimes over which Lisa's office lacks jurisdiction and venue to prosecute.4 6 One of the violent crimes happened in another state.
To complicate matters, because it took a week to arrange the interview of Jones
and another week for the FBI agent to begin his investigation of Jones's information (to attempt to corroborate or refute it as part of an assessment of its truth)
enough time passed that Steven 47 has soured on Jones. Steven now reports that
Jones balked at the plea agreement offered to him; that Jones insists on arguing for
a sentence reduction for his "minor role ' 48 in the charged crime, although Jones
does not qualify as such a "minor participant;" that Jones is "minimizing his
43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELmNS MANUAL § 5Ki.1 (2002) (allowing for a sentence reduction by means of
a departure from the otherwise applicable, but advisory, sentencing guideline range for a defendant's "substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense").
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (permitting the sentencing court to depart below a statutory minimum
sentence if the government files a motion indicating that the defendant substantially assisted in the investigation
or prosecution of another person).
45. In prosecutor jargon, such an interview is called a "proffer session." Such a meeting is normally
accompanied by a "proffer letter" outlining the rules that will govern the proffer. See, e.g., United States v. Burke,
243 Fed.App'x. 69, 73 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing the contents of a typical proffer letter in which the government
agreed that "no statements made by your client during this proffer will be used in the United States'
case-in-chief'). The cooperating defendant usually agrees to talk honestly and candidly about his own
involvement in crimes and about the crimes of others. In exchange, the interviewing prosecutor agrees not to use
the cooperator's words against him.
46. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (recognizing the limits on Congress's commerce
clause authority to reach crimes that do not involve the regulation of a commercial activity nor contain a
connection to interstate commerce).
47. Because Steven is assigned to prosecute Jones, he makes all "government" recommendations to the
sentencing judge about the value of Jones's cooperation and the appropriate sentence that Jones should receive.
See generally Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (recognizing that the government possesses the
power but no duty to file a substantial assistance motion, and that a prosecutor's discretion in making such a
motion is limited only by the defendant's due process rights). Presumably, this is the standard procedure in most,
if not all, U.S. Attorney's Offices. This was the custom in both U.S. Attorney's Offices where I worked.
48. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide for a decrease in the length of a defendant's sentence, if he plays a
lesser role in the commission of a crime. See U.S. STerEaNcG GUIDELN ES MAmkL § 3B1.2 (2002) (explaining
that based on a defendant's role as a "minimal participant" in criminal activity, his offense level under the federal
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involvement" in the drug conspiracy for which he is being prosecuted; and that
"there is no way Jones is receiving a 5Kl.1 sentence reduction for substantial
assistance." 4 9
This factually representative scenario demonstrates that a prosecutor's interaction with a cooperating defendant routinely raises questions abort whether and
how a prosecutor should use a cooperator's information to maximize the goals of
the federal system of justice.50 Without Jones's information, the federal government may never have discovered Smith's involvement in the four other federal
crimes of bank robbery, and without Jones's tip, two states may never solve the
violent crimes committed by Smith in those jurisdictions.5 1 Unless the leads are
investigated or disseminated, Smith will receive less punishment than he is due
and may completely escape responsibility for several of his crimes. Unsolved
crimes result in additional angst for victims who may continue to suffer from
unanswered questions about the perpetrators of their crimes, prolonging their
healing and denying them retribution and restitution. Furthermore, if the prosecutors ignore Jones's tip or fail to disseminate it to the appropriate law enforcement
authorities, someone other than Smith could be wrongly prosecuted for Smith's
52
acts, and Jones will likely believe that he was treated unfairly by "the system.",
Jones is likely to share his unfavorable experience with other would-be cooperators who may conclude that there is no benefit to speaking honestly and openly
with the government. 53 A somewhat competing, but equally important, concern the

sentencing guidelines should be decreased by four levels and that a role as a "minor participant" will reduce his
offense level by two levels).
49. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002) ("Upon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.").
50. Although terms like "maximize justice" are admittedly vague and ambiguous, it will be assumed that in
maximizing justice through her use of a cooperator, a federal prosecutor should, at a minimum, seek to adhere to
the DOJ's Mission: "to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to
provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of
unlawful behavior; ... and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans." DOJ.gov,
About the DOJ - Mission Statement and Statutory Authority, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008). In addition, the prosecutor must evaluate the value of every cooperating witness in light of
Congress's desire for proportional and equitable sentences. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1,
pt. A3 (2002) (explaining that two of the three primary goals of Congress in adopting the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 was "reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for
similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders" and "proportionality in sentencing through a system
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity"). Finally, due regard
should be given to the effectiveness of cooperation on crime prevention and successful prosecution, whether or
not the crime is one over which the federal government has jurisdiction.
51. Although these other jurisdictions unquestionably have an interest in Jones's information, Steven may
squelch the ability of those jurisdictions to effectively use the information.
52. See, e.g., Alan Ellis, FederalSentencing: PracticeTips: Part1, 20 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55,55 (2006) (noting
that many criminal defendants have cooperated with the government in anticipation of a sentencing benefit
without receiving a downward departure or other favorable sentencing treatment).
53. In other words, Steven's treatment of Jones could chill a potential cooperator from offering cooperation.
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 40 (noting that a "bargain is, after all, a bargain" and suggesting that double dealing
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scenario raises is sentencing disparity. The DOJ has expressed a desire that
defendants like Jones and Smith receive a sentence in the same range as other
defendants of similar culpability and comparable to those who have engaged in
similar efforts to assist law enforcement.54
In fact, through the federal sentencing statutes, and indirectly through the
federal Sentencing Guidelines, Congress has mandated sentencing proportionality
and the equitable imposition of criminal sentences.55 In deciding whether to pursue
Jones's lead, the prosecutors must decide the relative importance of Jones's
information. They must also determine whether or not Jones is the type of
defendant who should be granted a significant sentence reduction. Although
Jones's information about Smith's other crimes appears accurate, Jones was a
major participant in a violent drug ring, and, some would argue, is not worthy of a
sentence reduction. Plus, Lisa will have to resolve her conflict with Steven to make
the fullest use of the information, assuming she deems the cooperation worthy of
pursuit.
It is common for defendants to offer "cooperation" in hopes of gaining a
substantial assistance departure,5 6 but the routine nature of the scenario offers no
guarantee that prosecutors will make consistent or sound decisions about whether
to pursue the cooperation.
B. The Evidence of Prosecutors'DisparateUse of CooperatingDefendants
In 1998, two high-level employees of the U.S. Sentencing Commission produced a report that compiled information gathered between 1993 and 1997 by the
Commission's Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group. That Working Group
by the government "will create doubts about the rectitude of the criminal justice process"). On the other hand, if
Steven is too lenient in his dealings with Jones, Steven may encourage other would-be cooperators to concoct
false information about other criminals and crimes. See discussion infra Part I.B.
54. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att'y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors on Department Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing, Introductory Comment. (Sept.
22,2003), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/ops/pr/2003/SeptemberIO3._ag-516.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo]
(recognizing the desirable goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, including: "to guide sentencing discretion, so as to
narrow the disparity between sentences for similar offenses committed by similar offenders; and [] to provide for
the imposition of appropriately different punishments for offenses of differing severity").
55. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (directing the sentencing court to "impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary," to comply with the purposes of sentencing as otherwise identified in the
sentencing statute); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1), (2) (2003) (indicating that the purpose of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission is to further the purposes of sentencing identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and to provide certainty
and fairness in sentencing while "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct"); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2006) (directing the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to "assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower
sentence than would otherwise be imposed.., to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance").
56. See MAXFIELD AND KRAMEI, SuSTAsNAi AssIsTANCE, supra note 8, at 9 (acknowledging data gathered by
a substantial assistance working group formed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1991, which indicated that
"assistance to authorities was a common occurrence," regardless of whether the substantial assistance resulted in a
departure, including a finding that about two-thirds of all defendants sought to provide assistance to the
government in the prosecution of others).
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study uncovered disparity in the way federal districts defined and rewarded
"substantial assistance" resulting in sentencing departures.57 The working group
employed multiple methodologies, to analyze disparity in 5Ki.1 motions including: 1) a mail survey directed to U.S. Attorneys; 2) site visits to eight federal
districts in which the group conducted interviews of judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and probation officers, and telephone interviews with staff of several U.S.
Attorney's Offices; and 3) a "case coding" project.5 8 The working group was
studying whether or not the sentencing guidelines had reduced unwanted sentencing differences. 59 Data collected by the group in 1994 found that prosecutors
continued to vary in the way they awarded 5KI.1 departures, even after adoption
of the guidelines.6 ° The study also found that while all U.S. Attorney's Offices
claimed to have an office policy governing 5Kl.1 departures, the policies were
often ignored.6 1 The evidence "consistently indicated that factors that were
associated with either the making of a 5Ki.1 motion and the magnitude of the
departure were not consistent with principles of equity."'62 Moreover, the working
group was "not able to find direct correlations between type of cooperation
provided, type of benefit or result received by the government, the [government's]
making of a § 5KI.1 motion [for a sentence reduction], and the extent of
substantial assistance departure received., 63 While this information is dated, there
is no new evidence to suggest that recent events have significantly changed these
statistics.
In addition to this empirical evidence that suggests an inequitable use of
government 5Kl.1 motions to award cooperation, statistics compiled by the
Sentencing Commission show that the number of cases in which defendants are
granted sentence reductions for substantially assisting the government remains
quite low.64 As recently as 2005, only about 15.2% of defendants received a
sentence reduction based on their substantial assistance to the government in the
prosecution of another.65 Thus, the evidence suggests that cooperation could be
more equitably, effectively, and aggressively pursued by prosecutors within the
DOJ.

57. Id. at 20 ("[T]his analysis uncovered that the definition of "substantial assistance" was not being
consistently applied across the federal districts. Not only were some districts considering cooperation that was not
being considered by other districts, but the components of a given behavior that classified it as "substantial" were
unclear.").
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 5.
61. MAXFIELD AND KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 8, at 8.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id. at 20.
64. See supra note 9.
65. Id.
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C. The Source of Disparity
Disparity in the manner in which prosecutors use and reward cooperation is not
surprising. There are ninety-four U.S. Attorney's offices of varying sizes. Each
office is managed by a separate U.S. Attorney. 66 Each U.S. Attorney has his or her

own policies and procedures, and some of those U.S. Attorneys cloak assistant
U.S. attorneys with extensive autonomy. 67 Furthermore, the DOJ offers only
limited guidance about the factors prosecutors should balance when making
decisions about cooperation, and the Department provides no indication of which
factors should carry the most weight. For example, within the U.S. Attorney's
Manual, which acts as a policy manual for federal prosecutors, (but provides no
rights to defendant to enforce the policies), Section 9-23.210 speaks to a prosecutor's decision to grant immunity to someone when the testimony or information
68
that person is expected to provide "may be necessary to the public interest.,
Similarly, Section 9-27.620 identifies factors pertinent to entering into a nonprosecution agreement in exchange for cooperation. 69 But neither provision
attempts to balance the competing interests or to direct prosecutors who must do
so. Furthermore, the United States Attorney's Manual is silent regarding the value
of cooperation in support of both crimes committed in other districts and state
crimes over which the federal prosecutor lacks venue and jurisdiction.
Exacerbating the lack of direction from the DOJ is the fact that prosecutors
(such as Lisa and Steven in the hypothetical) have different personal backgrounds,
different levels of prosecutorial experience, and a personal and professional
interest in prosecuting their "own" defendants. All of these factors flavor how
prosecutors assess the particular value of a cooperator and his information.7' Thus,

66. There is one exception. Only one U.S. Attorney oversees Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.
67. In some offices, assistant U.S. attorneys act much like sole practitioners. They manage their own cases,
determining which cases to pursue to trial and which to push toward a plea. They also decide whether and when to
pursue or accept a defendant's cooperation.
68. U.S.A.M. 9-23.210 (1997). Section 9-23.210 says that prosecutors should consider the following factors:
1) the importance of the investigation to effective law enforcement; 2) the value of the testimony or information to
the investigation; 3) the person's relative culpability in connection to the offense being investigated; and 4) the
possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling her testimony. Id.
69. Id. 9-27.620 (listing: 1) importance of the case; 2) value of the cooperation; and 3) relative culpability and
criminal history as three important factors in prosecutor's decision to enter such an agreement).
70. As representatives of the federal sovereign, the prosecutors in the hypothetical represent the interests of
society in fully and fairly prosecuting Smith for all federal crimes he committed. They represent the interests of
the victims of the various federal bank robberies. They represent the sovereign's interest in ensuring that similarly
situated federal defendants are treated and punished similarly. Arguably, the federal prosecutors represent the
interests of others too, potentially including a responsibility to citizens of the states impacted by Smith's crimes,
as well as the individual victims of those crimes. In DOJ's Strategic Plan for 2000-2005, the Department declared
its commitment "to continuing and strengthening collaborative efforts with other federal agencies, states and
localities, tribal governments, community groups, foreign countries, and others." Department of Justice, DOJ's
Strategic Plan for 2000-2005 - Chapter II: Department of Justice Goals and Objectives: Fiscal Years 2000-2005,
http:llwww.usdoj.gov/archivelmps/strategic200O2005/chapter2.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). DOJ also announced: "We are committed to fulfilling our leadership responsibilities in forging a coordinated national and
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the individual prosecutor's broad discretion is necessarily exercised in a way that
reflects his or her own values and interests. Accordingly, individual prosecutors are
left to make decisions about cooperation that are destined to be different than those
another prosecutor would make under the same circumstances.
Why should federal prosecutors worry about these difficult issues? The answer
-ethics, professionalism and (most of all) justice.7"
III. A FEDERAL

PROSECUTOR'S ETmcAL OBLIGATIONS

The scholarly literature and decisions from the federal courts have been quick to
chastise prosecutors for overzealous exercise of prosecutorial discretion.72 But the
opposite is similarly troubling-prosecutors who through inexperience, lack of
training, personal interest, bias (known or subconscious), apathy, poor judgment,
or mistake tend to ignore, reject, or overlook information that could have and
would have solved crimes and resulted in convictions of guilty persons with just a

international response to crime and justice and assisting states, localities and tribal governments." Id. DOJ's
announced goals certainly seem to indicate that the prosecutors should consider the interests of the states in which
Smith committed crimes and the interests of all of his victims, even the state victims. See also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (noting an inscription on the wall in the Department of Justice stating, "The United States
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts").
71. Professor Michael Cassidy has also concluded that when a prosecutor decides to strike a deal with a
defendant's accomplice in exchange for cooperation, the prosecutor's decision to deal with the accomplice
implicates the prosecutor's ethical obligations. Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 655-56. Cassidy
believes that the prosecutor's ethics are implicated because the decision to deal with an accomplice gives the
cooperator an incentive to fabricate testimony and to minimize his own involvement in a crime. Id. Cassidy says
that such dealings "implicate[] the prosecutor's obligation of candor to the tribunal" and "sometimes impact[]
morality." Id. I conclude that a prosecutor's ethical obligations are implicated when dealing with a cooperator and
assessing the value of his information simply because the prosecutor is duty bound by the ethics rules to maximize
or "do" justice. "Doing justice," at a minimum, requires that every federal prosecutor expend her best efforts and
thoughtful analysis of cooperation to ensure that defendants are sentenced equitably and proportionally. This duty
arises from Congress and DOJ's expressed desire for sentencing fairness and uniformity. The duty also rests on
the imperative that a prosecutor evaluate whether or not a cooperator's information will lead to the prevention of
crime or successful prosecution of other criminals.
72. See Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 639 (advocating for a greater focus on the character
of the individual prosecutor who makes discretionary decisions and asserting that in a largely discretionary
system, better training and closer supervision of prosecutors, as well as the strengthening of rules, will not
"insulate criminal defendants from the potentially ruinous decisions of overzealous prosecutors"); see also
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 336 (1985) (addressing misstatements in the prosecutor's argument to the
jury); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (holding that suppression of evidence favorable to the
defendant can be prosecutorial abuse). Much of the scholarship discussing the ethical obligations of a prosecutor
focuses on the risk of convicting an innocent person because of the powerful discretion prosecutors wield. See,
e.g., Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 311-12 (discussing a prosecutor's ethical obligation to believe in a
defendant's guilt before seeking conviction and citing the risk that discretion creates-"the criminal justice
system often miscarries, almost always with tragic results"); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady
v. Maryland, 47 S.TEx. L. REv. 685, 728 (2006) ("[T]he absence of any legal or ethical sanctions to make
prosecutors accountable for violations produces a system marked by willful abuse of law, cynicism, and the real
possibility that innocent persons may be wrongfully convicted because of the prosecutor's misconduct."); Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv.
125 (2004).
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telephone call or some minimal follow-up investigation. Simply put, sometimes
federal prosecutors fail to capitalize on accurate and compelling cooperation.
Although the Executive Branch (and, thus, federal prosecutors) has exclusive legal
authority and extensive discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case,7 3
prosecutors must bear some responsibility beyond their purely legal obligations
when they evaluate whether to accept a valid lead or communicate the tip to some
investigative or prosecutorial agency that can effectively pursue it.
This Article posits that a prosecutor's unique, ethical duty to "do justice" always
demands a thoughtful and thorough evaluation of a cooperating defendant's
seemingly valid tips. Because of the potential importance of such leads, a
cooperator's seemingly valid information cannot ethically be rejected for the
prosecutor's personal gain, dislike of an informant, convenience, or other reasons
inconsistent with the mission of the DOJ, which is directed at ensuring justice for
all Americans. Likewise, when receiving tips from cooperators, prosecutors must
act in a way that complies with Congress's mandate for treating similarly-situated
defendants fairly and equitably.
Accordingly, to faithfully satisfy her ethical and professional duties as a
prosecutor, Lisa (in the hypothetical) must not accede to Steven's assessment of
Jones's value to the system of justice, if her thoughtful analysis of the tips suggests
that the federal government should pursue Jones's information, disseminate the
leads to state authorities, or award Jones a sentence reduction for assisting the
government. She must decide whether to seek supervisory or other intervention to
mediate and resolve the tension between her view and Steven's. She must
thoughtfully assess whether there is a need to communicate Jones's information
about the rapes and the child molestation to the state jurisdictions that may
capitalize on those tips. Finally, Steven and Lisa must attempt to exercise their
extensive prosecutorial discretion in a way that provides incentives for valuable
cooperation without undermining other goals of a procedurally and substantively
equitable and proportional system of justice.74 They must look beyond their own
75
cases, self-interests, and personal agendas and determine from a more global
perspective how justice can best be accomplished.

73. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (asserting that, while a prosecutor's discretion is
subject to constitutional constraints, the decision whether or not to prosecute and what charges to bring generally
rests entirely in the discretion of the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 693 (1974) (recognizing that the Executive Branch holds exclusive authority and "absolute discretion" to
decide whether to prosecute a case).
74. While the hypothetical situation presents intra-office, inter-office, and sovereign-wide dilemmas, similar
questions arise when a federal prosecutor evaluates proposed cooperation within a case in which one defendant
proposes to assist in the prosecution of a co-defendant.
75. By "global" perspective, I mean that the interests of states, counties, communities, and victims matter, as
do the societal interests represented within the district in which the prosecutor is authorized to prosecute cases.
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76

A. "DoingJustice ,

A federal prosecutor is subject to the ethical standards imposed on every
practicing lawyer by the state in which he or she practices law and to the local
federal court rules of that state. 77 In addition, "[tihe federal courts in analyzing
conduct unbecoming to a member of the bar turn invariably to the Model Rules or
other codes of professional conduct. 78 The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, as well as the parallel rules in many states, place "special," additional
responsibilities on prosecutors. 79 All of these rules essentially demand that a
prosecutor act fairly, honestly, impartially, and with a sense of fair dealing that the
rules categorize as "seeking justice." For instance, the comment to Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8 amplifies the prosecutor's responsibilities this way: "A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the
defendant is accorded80procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence.",
The American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section, also provides general
guidance for federal prosecutors. 81 In particular, Standard 3-1.2, entitled "The
Function of the Prosecutor," explains in pertinent part: "(b) The prosecutor is an
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor

76. The terms "doing" and "seeking" justice are used interchangeably in this Article.
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2000) (commonly called the "McDade Amendment") ("An attorney for the
Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each
State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State."); See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(h) (defining the phrase "state laws and rules and local federal court
rules governing attorneys" to mean "rules enacted or adopted by any State or Territory of the United States or the
District of Columbia or by any federal court, that prescribe ethical conduct for attorneys and that would subject an
attorney, whether or not a Department attorney, to professional discipline, such as a code of professional
responsibility"); 28 C.FR. § 77.3 (1999) ("In all criminal investigations and prosecutions ... attorneys for the
government shall conform their conduct and activities to the state rules and laws, and federal local court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in
the same manner as other attorneys in that State."). See also 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (1999) (defining "attorney for the
government" as including "any assistant United States attorney").
78. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8, 26 (1985) (citing the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the ABA Standard for Criminal Justice in evaluating the ethical conduct of a
federal prosecutor at trial).
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002) (listing several directives to prosecutors, including that
the prosecutor in a criminal case "shall" refrain from prosecuting a charge that he or she knows is unsupported by
probable cause and requiring that prosecutors "make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been
advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel"); see GEORGIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
(stating similar special requirements on prosecutors in the state of Georgia).
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002). As compared to the Comments, the Model Rules
are more definitive about a prosecutor's additional ethical obligations, but none of the responsibilities outlined in
either the Rules or the Comments addresses a prosecutor's dealings with cooperating witnesses. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr Rule 3.8.
81. See ABA CRImINAL JUSTICE SECION STANDARDS 3-1.1 (1993) (explaining that the standards "are intended
to be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance").

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:67

must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her8 functions.
(c) The
2
convict.",
to
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justice,
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prosecutor
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duty
In addition, Ethical Consideration8 3 7-13 says, "The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
merely convict. This special duty exists because . . . the prosecutor represents the
sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute."8 4 In short, the
various model rules and codes of professional conduct are uniform in demanding
that federal prosecutors "seek justice" and exercise their discretion soundly. But
the rules and codes are equally consistent in their failure (or inability) to delineate
what these benevolent "do justice"-type concepts mean.
Federal court decisions also discuss attributes of an ethical prosecutor.8 5 But the
courts, too, talk in utopian platitudes. Perhaps the most quoted case discussing a
prosecutor's ethical responsibilities (or at least the best known among federal
prosecutors) is Berger v. United States,8 6 in which the United States Supreme
Court declared:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer ....
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
87
one.

Even when the federal courts have discussed the prosecutor's special duties in
the context of dealing with cooperators, the guidance has been general. For
instance, discussing the risks of using and rewarding "criminals as witnesses," the
Ninth Circuit has said, "Because the government decides whether and when to use
such witnesses, and what, if anything, to give them for their services, the

82. Id. 3-1.2.
83. The Ethical Considerations "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPoNsIBILrrY, Preliminary Statement (1983).

84. Id. at EC 7-13.
85. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) (noting the publicly accountable prosecutor's
ethical obligation to win, advocate for his client, and to "serve the cause of justice"); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S.

648, 671 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing the view that a
prosecutor has "the right, indeed the duty, to use all legal and ethical means to obtain a conviction" including the
right to exercise peremptory jury strikes); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973) (reiterating that
prosecutors may strike "hard blows" but not "foul ones") (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88

(1935)).
86. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
87. Id. at 88.
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government stands uniquely positioned to guard against perfidy. By its actions, the
government can either contribute to or eliminate the problem." 88 In sum, the rules
and the courts concur - a federal prosecutor is duty bound to "do justice," whatever
"doing justice" requires.8 9
B. The Trouble with "Justice"
Even when prosecutors "seek justice" in their dealings with cooperators, there is
no guarantee that justice will result. After all, what does it mean to "do justice?"
And how can individual prosecutors gauge whether or not they are achieving it?
1. "Doing Justice" Has Multiple Meanings
As numerous legal experts have recognized, "doing justice" is a concept that
"has no universally accepted meaning and does not lend itself to easy interpretation." 90 The concept may have one meaning when a prosecutor is trying a case and
another when she is advising an investigative agent. 91 One legal scholar has said
that the vague nature of the ethical directive "leaves prosecutors with only their
individual sense of morality to determine just conduct."92
Undoubtedly, if prosecutors are left to weigh justice for themselves, their sense
of "right" and their beliefs about the wisest course to follow will inevitably depend
on infinite, opaque factors, many probably unknowable and unidentifiable even to
the prosecutors themselves. When left unguided about its meaning, a prosecutor's

88. United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331,333-34 (9th Cir. 1993).
89. When a federal prosecutor engages in allegedly improper conduct, the conduct is investigated by the
Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.39 (2007).
90. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics of ProsecutorialTrialPractice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REv. 45, 46 n.4 (1991). See also Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 637 (noting the
general nature of the ethical directive to prosecutors and the lack of criteria for them to "determine what is just");
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FoRDHAM URB.L.J. 607, 608 (1999) (noting that
the source of the prosecutor's responsibility was "never identified" and that "[iut assumed different meanings in
different contexts"); id. at 622 (describing the phrase "seek justice" as vague and asserting that "[s]tanding alone
... [the phrase] points in many directions"). But see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1120 (1988) (acknowledging that the meaning of justice in the ethics context is less than
clear but contending that judgments about "justice" are not arbitrary, only controversial, and asserting that
"judgments" about legality and justice are grounded in the norms and practices of the surrounding legal culture).
91. See Zacharias, supra note 90, at 46 nn. 3-4 (acknowledging that the term "do justice" has no universal
meaning and that "[tihe duty to 'do justice' applies to all governmental attorneys, but takes on its most dramatic
significance in criminal prosecutions"); see also Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 638 (noting
that justice may mean several overlapping but different things simultaneously, including safeguarding the
substantive and procedural rights of an accused, exhibiting general "fairness" to others, and showing consistency
in decision making); Green, supra note 90, at 616 (describing the disciplinary rules applicable to prosecutors as
"barely scratch[ing] the surface" of defining the prosecutor's duty to "seek justice" in different aspects of their
jobs).
92. Zacharias, supra note 90, at 48 (citing George T. Frampton, Some Practical and Ethical Problems of
ProsecutingPublic Officials, 36 MD.L. REv. 5, 8 (1976)); see also Rory K. Little, Proportionalityas an Ethical
PreceptforProsecutorsin Their InvestigativeRole, 68 FORDHAM L. REy. 723,738 (1999) (noting the "remarkably
little references to the prosecutor's investigative function in ethical codes").
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sense of justice will be impacted by her personal ambitions, life experiences,
religious beliefs, history (if any) as a victim of crime, degree of cynicism about the
world, peer pressures in the office (whether conscious or subconscious), attitudes
of the leaders within her office, pressures from the defense bar, and the list goes
on. 9 3 Because there can be as many definitions of "do justice" as there are
prosecutors and fact scenarios,9 4 without some discussion of its meaning in a given
context, there will be a built-in
disparity in how prosecutors undertake to fulfill
95
their duty to "seek justice.,
In an article published in 1999, Professor Bruce A. Green explored how
prosecutors should "conduct themselves in light of the principle that has traditionally been thought to define the prosecutor's professional ethos: the duty to seek
justice. 9 6 In his article, Green avoided addressing specific areas of a prosecutor's
conduct in favor of targeting "the overarching concept. ' 97 In evaluating the
concept, he delineated two types of "ethical" implications: 1) prosecutorial
decisions, which may be "subject to legal rules that have been (or arguably should
98
be) adopted by courts or other appropriate bodies to control lawyers' conduct";
and 2) a more nebulous, broader sense of ethics; "involving what a prosecutor
should do in situations where the law offers a choice." 99 Assessing the value of a
cooperator's information and deciding whether and how to act in response to the
information could not fall more squarely within the second, "choice," category
described by Green. It would be impossible for Congress or the courts to fashion
effective rules to guide each prosecutor in the myriad of dilemmas she will face in
dealing with cooperators. Worse yet, any such rules could unduly restrict the
prosecutor's ability to respond quickly and with a tailored reaction to the varying
scenarios cooperating defendants are certain to present.
Because of the difficulty in creating rules effective for every situation, and given
the need for prosecutorial discretion and flexibility in dealing with unique factual

93. These factors 'of life experiences, beliefs, history of victimization, and the like are the same indicators that a
trial lawyer seeks to uncover in jurors during voir dire because such factors impact the way a juror will view and
decide a case. Such factors suggest bias, conflicts, and leanings for and against certain positions that are not
logically connected to a case or defendant.
94. Professor Bruce A. Green suggests that doing justice "assume[s] different meanings in different contexts,
meanings that one [can] only infer." Green, supra note 90, at 608. He asserts that in the context of exercising
discretion in deciding whether to charge someone or defer prosecution, "doing justice" means "seeking to achieve
a just, and not necessarily the most harsh result." Id. Green says that in the "trial context, the concept seem[s] to
mean something else ... something to do with fidelity to the fairness of the process." Id.
95. Some prosecutors value convictions the most; others give maximum value to ensuring that innocent
persons are never convicted. See Zacharias, supra note 90, at 48 ("Some [attorneys] will decide that justice lies in
conviction at all cost; others will bend over backwards to vindicate defendants' rights") (citing Dr. George T.
Felkenes, The Prosecutor:A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 98 (1975)).
96. Green, supranote 90, at 611.
97. Id. at611-12.
98. Id. at 618-19 (citing John M. Burkoff, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows," 53 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 271 (1992)).
99. Id. at 619.
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situations, no specific rules should be adopted. 1°° Instead, as further discussed in
Parts IV.A and V.B., the DOJ should develop and publicize an extensive list of
factors pertinent to a prosecutor's evaluation of cooperators and provide numerous
examples of how such factors might be balanced in different contexts. Through
communication about the factors and the weight that each factor might carry, the
Department can begin to create a "best practices" for evaluating tipsters. The
Department should discuss these best practices in an effort to encourage "a
culture" that fosters an environment in which federal prosecutors can better define
what "doing justice" means when they seek to make effective, balanced and
consistent use of cooperators and their information.
2. The Prosecutor'sBroad Discretion Can Impair Her Ability To "Do Justice"
Federal prosecutors wield broad discretion with little guidance from the Constitution, 10 1 statutes, or the DOJ's policies and procedures1" 2 when they are asked to
decide whether to use and investigate information proffered by a defendant who
seeks to "cooperate" in the investigation and prosecution of another criminal. The
established law does not demand10 any
response to a defendants offer to cooperate,
3
let alone dictate a particular one.
Although a federal prosecutor's discretion is broad when charging crimes, it is,
perhaps, the broadest when dealing with cooperating witnesses." ° Even the power
that a low-level, assistant U.S. attorney levies over cooperating defendants is
100. But see Little, supra note 92, at 752 (proposing specific ethical rules to guide prosecutors in the
investigative stage).
101. The Constitution would most assuredly prohibit a prosecutor from selecting or rejecting cooperators
based on their race, gender or religion. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (acknowledging
that a prosecutor's discretion is subject to constitutional constraints, including limits imposed by the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
102. There is some DOJ guidance that generally discusses sentence reductions for a defendant's substantial
assistance. See, e.g., Memorandum from Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., to all U.S. Attorneys on Ensuring Racial
Neutrality in Prosecution Practices 1-2 (Jan. 9, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/aglreadingroom/
racenut.htm [hereinafter Reno Memo] (discussing the need for race neutral decisions about substantial assistance
motions and requiring that all such motions be approved at the supervisory level). See also U.S.A.M. 1 9-27.400,
and 9-23.210 (2002) (outlining factors that a prosecutor should consider when determining whether to grant
immunity to someone in exchange for testimony or information); Id. 9-27.620 (addressing non-prosecution
agreements). But there are no policies prohibiting a prosecutor from ignoring information from a potential
cooperator.
103. See Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 656 (arguing that "there are very few systematic
checks on a prosecutor's discretionary decision to offer leniency in exchange for cooperation").
104. The Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys have enormous discretion in deciding whom and how to
prosecute. 'This broad discretion [afforded the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985)) (brackets in original).
Historically, assistant U.S. attorneys had much more discretion in charging decisions than they do today. The
"Ashcroft Memo" issued in 2003 by then Attorney General John Ashcroft restricted the freedom of prosecutors in
selecting charges. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 54 (setting forth basic policies that all federal prosecutors must
follow in charging). In the Ashcroft Memo, the Attorney General announced that DOJ policy requires that "federal
prosecutors ... charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supportable by
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extensive. ° 5 Moreover, there is no rule of ethics speaking to the specific topic of
cooperating witnesses. 106
Because a willing and able federal defendant cannot provide substantial assistance to the government or glean any benefit at sentencing without the prosecutor's
participation and support, a prosecutor's use or non-use of a cooperator and his
information presents an acute ethical dilemma. A prosecutor can decide unilaterally and in secret whether or not to pursue a lead from a cooperator. The prosecutor
10 7
is not obligated to tell her supervisor that a defendant has offered to cooperate.
She has no legal duty to tell the victims of the target defendant's crime. And even if
the prosecutor explores the tip to some degree, she bears no obligation to seek a
sentence reduction on behalf of the cooperating defendant. From a legal perspective, she can act negligently, or maybe even randomly.10 8
a. SubstantialasSistance departuresencompass extensive prosecutorial
discretion
Many a federal defendant has asserted that he was willing, able, and (often) did
provide substantial assistance to the government but was never rewarded for his
cooperation because the prosecutor refused to file the necessary motion.10 9 A
typical cooperation provision in a plea agreement leaves the prosecutor almost
unlimited discretion to decide whether to support a 5Kl.1 departure.110 For
the facts of the case" Id. Neither former Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales nor his successor Michael B.
Mukasey has rescinded the directives in the Ashcroft Memorandum.
105. See Gershman, Duty to Truth, supranote 7, at 314 (noting the prosecutor's ethical duty "to truth" because
of "prosecutor's domination of the criminal justice system and his virtual monopoly of the fact-finding process").
106. See Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 654 (noting that neither the text of Model Rule 3.8
nor the ABA's criminal Justice Standards provide any direction for conscientious prosecutors on the related topic
of granting leniency to a codefendant in exchange for cooperation and noting a lack of academic attention to the
subject).
107. There is no legal or regulatory obligation imposed on the individual prosecutor. Presumably, an individual
U.S. Attorney's Office or an individual supervisor within an office could impose a policy or practice requiring
supervisory consultations. Nevertheless, if an individual prosecutor decides in favor of using a cooperator, the
assistant U.S. attorney would be obligated to seek supervisory approval for a 5Kl.1 sentence reduction. See
U.S. A.M. 9-27.400 (2002).
108. But see infra note 109 for a discussion of Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (explaining that the
Supreme Court seems to deny prosecutors the power to act arbitrarily in denying substantial assistance motions).
109. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (recounting a defendant's claim of substantial
assistance but holding that the federal district court maintains authority to review a prosecutor's decision refusing
to file a substantial assistance motion only if the prosecutor's decision "was based on unconstitutional motives");
See also Ellis, supra note 52, at 55 ("Many of us have been in situations where our client has cooperated to
comply with the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and yet the government has refused to file a
5Kl.1 motion for downward departure based on substantial assistance."); Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note, 5K1.1 And
SubstantialAssistance Departure:The Illusory Carrotof the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1519, 1519-20 (1991) (recounting case in which assistant U.S. attorney acknowledged at sentencing that
defendant provided vital testimony for government but refused to file 5KI.I motion based on office policy against
such motions without the defendant's having gone "under cover").
110. See, e.g., U.S. v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir. 1998) rev'd en banc, 165 F3d 1297 (10th Cir.
1999) (recounting the language in a typical plea agreement related to cooperation).
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instance, a typical plea agreement might provide the following language relevant
to cooperation efforts: "[T]he government would file a motion under USSG
§ 5Kl.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), if, in its sole
discretion, [the cooperator]'s
'
cooperation amounted to substantial assistance." I
John McTiernan, the director of several Hollywood movies (including Die
Hard, Predator,and Basic), recently confronted a similar provision when he pled
guilty to making a false statement to the FBI during its investigation of Anthony
Pellicano, who is suspected of masterminding "a long-running wiretapping conspiracy on behalf of stars, studio executives and others in the entertainment
industry." 112 Defendant McTiernan lied to investigators about hiring Mr. Pellicano
to wiretap conversations of the producer of one of his films.' 13 After pleading
guilty, Mr. McTiernan offered to assist in the investigation and prosecution of Mr.
Pellicano,
but the prosecutors "thought he was not being truthful" and rejected his
4
help.

11

From the defendant's perspective, the federal prosecutor's refusal to support a
substantial assistance departure is particularly discouraging because the defendant
cannot simply look to the sentencing judge's generosity for some other equivalent
sentencing departure." 5 While it is true that a cooperating defendant is "not a
strong candidate for sympathy ... whatever his moral worth, his fate under and
after the cooperation agreement deserves attention because16it is an important index
of the fairness and integrity of the prosecutorial system.""1
There are only two legal sources for a sentencing judge's authority to downwardly depart from the otherwise applicable (now advisory) federal Sentencing
Guideline range based on a defendant's "substantial assistance" or "cooperation"
to the government. Both sources derive from the federal prosecutor's decision to
hear and then use the cooperator's information. The first source rests in the
sentencing statute. That statute permits a sentencing court to depart below an
otherwise mandatory statutory minimum sentence, if a defendant substantially
assists authorities." 7 The federal sentencing Guidelines provide the second source
for a sentence reduction, but they do not authorize a sentence below a statutory

111. Id.
112. David M. Halbfinger and Allison Hope Weiner, Movie DirectorGiven 4 Months for Lying About Hiring
Detective, N.Y. Tts, Sept. 25, 2007, at C-4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Noelle Tsigounis Valentine, Note, An Exploration of the Feeney Amendment: The Legislation That
Prompted the Supreme Court to Undo Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 619, 627-29
(2005) (explaining the history and effect of the Feeney Amendment on downward departures).
116. Hughes, supranote 1, at 40.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (providing that upon "motion of the Government, the court shall have the
authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense").
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minimum." 8
In either instance, a defendant is virtually impotent to gain a sentence reduction,
unless the federal prosecutor chooses to investigate (hopefully corroborate) and
rely on the cooperator's information, and even then, arguably, only if the prosecution files the necessary formal motion at the defendant's sentencing hearing or
thereafter." 9
i. The first legal sourcefor a substantialassistancedeparture-18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e)
According to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a sentencing judge must not reduce a
defendant's sentence below a statutorily mandated minimum sentence, unless a
prosecutor files a motion and authorizes such a departure.' 20 A defendant's
unilateral claim that he "provided substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant
to [a sentence reduction,] a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing.' 12 1 Section 3553(e) always requires a "motion of the Government." 122 A
sentencing court is rarely empowered even to review the government's decision in
118. See U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl (2002) (expressly authorizing a departure from the
otherwise applicable Guidelines when "a convicted defendant provides 'Substantial Assistance to Authorities').
Until January 2005, trial courts were required to apply the federal Guidelines in a mechanical manner. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (declaring the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional). Except in very circumscribed instances, sentencing courts did not have discretion to withhold application
of the Guidelines to certain defendants or to lessen the severity of the Guidelines for specific factual scenarios. Id.
at 233-35 (finding that the "availability of a departure in specified circumstances does not avoid the constitutional
issue'"). But in Booker, the Supreme Court decided that as long as the sentencing statute mandated that trial courts
apply the Guidelines, the Guidelines were unconstitutiopal. Id. at 245. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
remarked:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of
facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment .... For when a trial judge exercises his
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. The Guidelines as written, however, are
not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges.
Id. at 233. Finding the Guidelines mandatory and, therefore, unconstitutional, a majority of the Court "remedied"
the unconstitutionality of the Guidelines by declaring them "advisory." More specifically, the Court struck two
provisions in the Sentencing statute-18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (which made the Guidelines mandatory) and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (which the Court said "depend[ed] upon the Guidelines' mandatory nature"). Id. at 245.
According to the Court, these "modifications" to the sentencing statute "[require] a sentencing court to consider
Guidelines ranges.., but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well." Id.
119. A federal defendant can receive a downward departure at the time of his sentencing. He can also receive a
sentence reduction for substantial assistance after imprisonment. See FaD. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (permitting the court
to reduce a convicted defendant's sentence even post-imprisonment "[ulpon the government's motion").
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000); see also Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 123-24 (1996) (holding
that a government motion attesting to the defendant's substantial assistance and requesting the sentencing court to
depart below the applicable Guideline range does not simultaneously permit the court to depart below a statutory
minimum sentence).
121. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
122. Id. at 185.
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refusing to file a substantial assistance motion under Section 3553(e). 123 As
declared by the Supreme Court in Wade v. United States, Section 3553(e) limits the
sentencing court's authority and gives the prosecutor "a power, [but] not a duty, to
file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted." 124
ii. The second legal sourcefor a substantialassistancedeparture-thefederal
Sentencing Guidelines
The applicable substantial assistance departure provision in the federal Sentencing Guidelines states: "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines."' 125 Thus, the government also arguably holds the only key to a departure
accorded by the Guidelines. Nevertheless, many experts assert that after the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in United States v. Booker, 126 "judges can now
impose a sentence that is below the advisory guidelines ([but] not [below] a
[statutory] minimum sentence), even without a government motion for coopera127
tion."'
Even if a sentencing judge can depart downward for the defendant's substantial
assistance without the government's motion, the defendant, as a practical matter,
cannot provide such assistance without some willingness and participation by the
federal prosecutors or their agents. The defendant will be hard pressed to
demonstrate assistance, let alone "substantial" assistance, if his tips are ignored or

123. Id. Notably, though, Wade was decided long before the Court declared the mandatory nature of the federal
sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
124. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185. Defendant Wade presented a compelling case. He pled guilty to drug charges and
unquestionably provided law enforcement agents with information that led to the arrest of another person who had
been distributing drugs. Id. at 181, 183. But the government refused to file a motion for a substantial assistance
downward departure. Id. at 184. Although the Court rejected Wade's contention that he was entitled to a departure
without the government's motion, the Court, nevertheless, suggested that a defendant would be entitled to relief if
a prosecutor refused to file a substantial-assistance motion based on "an unconstitutional motive," id. at 185-86, or
"if the prosecutor's refusal to move was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end." Id. at 186.
125. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002).
126. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For an additional discussion on United States v. Booker, see supra note 118.
127. Ellis, supra note 52, at 55. See also India Geronimo, Comment, "Reasonably Predictable:" Reluctanceto
Embrace Judicial Discretion for Substantial Assistance Departures, 33 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1321 (2006)
(discussing judge's increased discretion after Booker to depart from the federal Guidelines pursuant to 5Kl.1
without a government motion); but see United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that after Booker a defendant is not entitled to a 5Kl.1 departure without a government motion). Whether
a government motion is required or not, "[t]he appropriate [amount of any] reduction [for substantial assistance)
shall be determined by the court." U.S. SENTENCNG GumDELINEs MANuAL § 5Kl.l(a) (noting that in deciding the
"appropriate reduction" the court may consider: (1) "the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of
the defendant's assistance, taking into account the government's evaluation of the assistance;" (2) "the
truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;" (3) "the
nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;" (4) the risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from
his assistance; and (5) the timeliness of the assistance).
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never investigated and used.
Because federal prosecutors independently decide whether and when to grant a
defendant an opportunity to cooperate (and usually also unilaterally determine
whether the cooperation is worth any sentence reduction), the prosecutor's power
to award or deny a substantial-assistance sentence reduction is virtually unlimited.12 8 There are few restraints even on prosecutors' arbitrary and capricious
decisions about cooperation, and fewer restrictions still on a prosecutor's poorlyreasoned decisions about cooperators and the use of their information. There is no
automatic review of a prosecutor's malicious decision to disregard a cooperator's
seemingly valid information. There is no legal mandate that a supervisor re-assess
a lower-level prosecutor's decision to ignore a seemingly valid tip. Thus, there is
virtually unfettered discretion and no review of an unwise, malevolent, or random
decision on cooperation.
b. The DOJ'spolicies and proceduresprovide only limited guidance to
prosecutors
The U.S. Attorney's Manual 129 provides the only formal direction for federal
prosecutors grappling with decisions about cooperation, and that direction is quite
general.' 30 Sometimes policy-makers within DOJ disseminate informal guidance
about cooperation, but those directives typically target a perceived and specific
problem. For example, on January 10, 2007, Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty provided some informal guidance to prosecutors dealing with coopera-

128. Disparity in the way similarly situated defendants are treated is one negative aspect of a prosecutor's
unbridled discretion in dealing with cooperators. See MAxFIED AND KRAMER, SuasTANtTAL ASSISTANCE, supra
note 8, at 20-21(indicating findings that the definition of "substantial assistance" was not consistently applied
across federal districts and that the making of SKI.I motions was not based on factors indicating principles of
equity). The federal Sentencing Guidelines were adopted, at least in large part, to avoid such disparity. Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (indicating that the goal of the federal Sentencing Guidelines was "to
reduce unjustified disparities" and "reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing
marks of any principled system of justice"). Likewise, past administrations of the DOJ have expressed concern
about unintended gender, race and religious bias when prosecutors exercise unguided discretion. See Reno Memo,
supranote 102, at 1-2 (advising that as the chief federal law enforcement officers in their districts, U.S. Attorneys
should take a leadership role in ensuring an awareness of issues of racial disparity and should examine their
office's practices regarding race-neutral exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
129. The United States Attorneys' Manual outlines internal operating procedures for assistant U.S. attorneys.
USAM Tit. 9 (2000). Although the Manual does not talk in terms of "seeking justice," the guidance it contains is
designed to standardize charging, and add to uniformity in the way defendants are treated. These goals are
presumably designed to "maximize justice." Id.; see alsoAshcroft Memo, supra note 54. (implementing a policy
in which federal prosecutors are generally directed to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses" in an effort to encourage consistency in prosecutorial discretion in charging and sentencing
recommendations).
130. See, e.g., USAM U 9-27.600-630; 9-23.210; 9-27.620; supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. The
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides the most specific guidance to prosecutors, but the Guidelines are not
binding, and a judge cannot force a prosecutor to rely on them. See U.S. SErrECcIN GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K1.1 (2002) and supra Part III.B.2.a,
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tors who offer information about foreign intelligence. 1 3 1 In his memo, Mr.

McNulty discussed the need for "all federal prosecutors to be trained on the
identification and utilization of F[oreign] I[ntelligence] information" 132 and urged
U.S. attorneys to increase incentives for such cooperating defendants. 133 Likewise,
a memo
in 1998, then Attorney General Janet Reno sent assistant U.S. attorneys
134
discussing the need to ensure race neutral decisions on cooperation.
Although there is limited direction to prosecutors who must decide whether to
pursue or reject a cooperator's efforts, there are DOJ procedures to monitor the
size of every 5K1.1 sentence reduction. 135 In my experience, these procedures tend
to reduce the size of sentence reductions a prosecutor may recommend for a
defendant's substantial assistance. Moreover, while there is this check on the
amount of the reduction a cooperating defendant can receive once the assistant
U.S. attorney pursues the cooperator's information, there are no equivalent
requirements that a prosecutor advise a supervisor or anyone else when she rejects
what appears to be valuable and accurate information about other crimes and
criminals. There is no legal requirement or DOJ policy prohibiting a prosecutor
from ignoring a valid tip, even if the prosecutor ignores the tip out of ignorance,
lack of training, convenience, apathy or personal dislike of the cooperator.
Furthermore, a defendant has no recourse through the prosecutor's supervisor or
from any other DOJ policy.
Even if a prosecutor chooses to listen to a defendant's claims about other
criminals and other crimes, the prosecutor has no well-defined legal responsibility
to follow-up on a lead, charge the target of the information, relay the information
to another, appropriate law enforcement authority or, even, to share the information with her supervisor or other assistant U.S. attorneys. The prosecutor is left to
decide for herself, 136 and, aside from possible tarnish to her reputation, there are no
designated penalties for her failure to act wisely in deciding what response to take
to a valid tip.
It is axiomatic that federal prosecutors rely to some degree on their own
subjective gauges when exercising their prosecutorial discretion, but when they
depend solely on their instincts, without concrete guidelines to direct their
discretion, they risk making subjective, biased and self-interested decisions.13 7

131. McNulty Memo, supra note 19.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 102.

135. See USAM 9-27.400 (2007) (requiring supervisory approval of an assistant U.S. attorney's proposed
downward departure).
136. See Barry Scheck, Closing Remarks, 23 CARozo L. REv. 899, 899 (2002) (indicating that decisions
about "the credibility of snitches" are made "outside the crucible of trial and the adversary system").
137. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1590 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors sometimes fail to make decisions that
rationally further justice because prosecutors are irrational human beings).
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These opportunities for such subjective and biased choices result in strong
potential for inconsistent and inequitable handling of similarly situated defendants
and situations, the very evils Congress hoped to combat when it enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.138
The lack of concrete direction for prosecutors who use cooperating witnesses
undermines every federal prosecutor's ethical and professional duty to "do
justice." There is simply no guarantee that a cooperator with information crucial to
the avoidance or resolution of a heinous or particularly dangerous crime will be
effectively heard or rewarded at the charging or sentencing phase of the case or
thereafter. There is, likewise, no guarantee that a defendant who provides important information to resolve a case in one federal district will receive the same level
of reward for his cooperation as a defendant similarly situated in another federal
district.
c. The incentivesfor prosecutorsto "do justice" are inadequategiven the
various conflicting interests associatedwith cooperation
Other than a desire and responsibility to "do justice," often there are no
incentives (sometimes there are disincentives) for a prosecutor to pursue a
cooperator's lead. For instance, there is no personal or observable benefit to a
prosecutor who learns from a cooperating defendant that another defendant has
committed numerous, albeit heinous, state crimes. Assuming the cooperator's
information is accurate, the prosecutor will not be able to capitalize on the
information to improve her record of successful prosecutions. The victims of the
cooperator's federal crimes will not usually be impressed that through "cooperating" on some other crime the perpetrator of their crime is gaining a lighter
sentence. At best, the prosecutor will pass the cooperator's information along to
someone in the proper state who maintains the authority to investigate and
prosecute state crimes, and that person will exercise his own vast discretion to
determine whether and what to charge. Of course, there is no guarantee that the
state will prosecute the case or that such prosecution will succeed in convicting the
wrongdoer.
The same is true of information about crimes committed in other federal

138. The federal Sentencing Guidelines seek to impose comparable sentences for comparable crimes and

convicts. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2464 (2007) (outlining Congress's desire to further "basic
purposes of criminal punishment," including "deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just
punishment, and rehabilitating the offender" and Congress's goals of "uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the
wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct" and "proportionality

in sentencing") (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GuiDEINES MANUAL § 1A.1, pt. All 2-3 (2002)); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-67 (1989) (explaining the history behind adoption of the federal Sentencing
Guidelines). Congress has also expressed its interest in the imposition of comparable and equitable sentencing.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (directing the sentencing court to impose a sentence on each defendant that
reflects sufficient but not unnecessary punishment and that supports the purposes of sentencing, including

promoting respect for the law and providing for "just" punishment).
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districts.13 9 Even if a prosecutor learns valuable information from a defendant
about crimes in her own district, which she could indict, there is no assurance that
the prosecutor assigned to the cooperating defendant's case will adequately reward
that defendant for sharing information. A prosecutor may expend time and
resources pursuing a case that ultimately fails because the cooperator's prosecutor
"sours" on "his" defendant and thereby encumbers the successful prosecution of
the targets of the cooperator's information.
i. Conflicts can arisewhen a cooperator'sinformation relates to state crimes

Not uncommonly, someone who violates a federal law has also broken one or
more state laws." When a defendant breaches both federal and state law, issues
can arise over which sovereign should exercise priority to prosecute and whether
or not a federal defendant should be rewarded for providing information valuable
to the prosecutionof one or more state crimes but not helpful to the resolution of
another federal crime."'
Should a federal defendant who defrauds 500 elderly, minority victims receive a
5KI.1 sentence reduction, if he helps in a state's prosecution of another defendant
who tortured and sexually assaulted one middle-aged woman? Such judgment
calls have no correct answer, but they can match the interests of one jurisdiction
against the interests of another. In a world where resources are unlimited, a
criminal would be prosecuted fully and completely in every venue. But sometimes
a serious and violent crime can be solved only with the help of a cooperating
defendant's information and only with a corresponding and significant reduction in
the length of his sentence in another serious case.
ii. Conflicts can arisefrom the interests of victims
Second only to knowing whether the perpetrator of his crime will be convicted,
a victim wants to know how long a defendant's term of incarceration will be.
Because a federal defendant's agreement to cooperate in the prosecution of others
can significantly reduce the length of his sentence (although not the amount he
owes victims in restitution), a victim may oppose his cooperation. Even with the
expansion of victims' rights, 14 2 a federal prosecutor is not obligated to consult, or
even inform, a crime victim before using a cooperator and his information in the
139. The difference when dealing with crimes in other federal jurisdictions is that the prosecutor can seek to
facilitate a global plea deal with the offending defendant.
140. See USAM
8-3.170 (2003) (noting that frequently "conduct which deprives persons of federally
protected rights in violation of federal law also violates state law").
141. This analysis will obviously include some balancing of monetary costs and resource availability, but for
purposes of this inquiry (one that the prosecutor must undertake before knowing the balance of interests and
resources), the question is posed with little regard for the financial burdens on each sovereign in an effort to focus
the query on the difficult decision prosecutors face when comparing state and federal interests.
142. See infra Part V.B.2.a. (discussing the Crime Victims' Rights Act).
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prosecution of another. The victim has a right to be heard at sentencing but no right
to "be heard" or object to cooperation.
This can pit one victim's interests against another's. Although one crime victim
may oppose the prosecutor's reliance on information provided by the perpetrator
of his crime, the victim of the target defendant would usually favor such
cooperation. Without the cooperator's help, the second victim's crime may go
unsolved or unprosecuted.14 3 Which victim's interests are paramount? As with so
many decisions about cooperation and cooperators, there is no one "right" answer.
iii. Conflicts can arise when prosecutorsevaluate the relative culpabilityof
defendants
In addition to questions that arise from the competing interests between
sovereigns, districts, and victims, the interests and competing equities of defendants within multi-defendant cases can give rise to ethical concerns. 144 Should the
defendant who first offers to cooperate in a multi-defendant case receive the
greatest or sole benefit of cooperation? What if the first defendant to offer
cooperation is also the defendant who appears to be the most culpable? Professor
Michael Cassidy has evaluated the ethical problems presented by the "[t]urncoat
[a]ccomplice" in an article arguing in favor of devoting more attention to the
character of the prosecutors who make decisions about which defendants to
reward. 145 As Professor Cassidy correctly notes, "These are the sort
of difficult
146
over."'
sleep
lose
prosecutors
seasoned
most
the
even
decisions that
d. Discretionallows strong potentialfor prosecutorialabuse
"There is no doubt that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system
vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and
institutional abuse."' 4 7 Without some specific guidance, or at least expressed

143. See Douglas E. Beloof, JudicialLeadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act: Judge
Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENr'G REP. 36, 40 (2006) (noting that "the

government [prosecutor] represents the people, not the individual victim" and that "[v]ictims are often under the
illusion that prosecutors represent them, and are surprised when they find out it is not so").
144. For a fuller discussion of the competing interests presented by cooperating defendants within a given
case, see Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 655-56.
145. Id. at 640-53.

146. Id. at 660.
147. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). As the Court noted in Bordenkircher,the potential for
prosecutorial abuse has "led to many recommendations that the prosecutor's discretion should be controlled by
means of either internal or external guidelines." Id. at 365 n.9 (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNmENT
PROCEDURE FOR CRIMIUAL JUSTICE §§ 350.3(2)-(3) (1975); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The
Prosecution Function §§ 2.5, 3.9 (App. Draft 1971); Norman Abrahms, InternalPolicy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971)); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution,93 VA. L. REv. 853, 913 (2007) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in the context of organizational
prosecutions); Burke, supranote 137, at 1588 (noting instances of prosecutorial overzealousness, including one in
which prosecutors refused to concede a defendant's innocence after DNA evidence led to a gubernatorial pardon);
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expectations, about how to weigh the importance of pursuing and evaluating a
cooperator's lead, a prosecutor may allow his personal interests, biases, unique
background, and numerous other unidentifiable factors to infect his ability to "do
justice." Such factors may inhibit a prosecutor's capacity to make the best
decisions about a cooperator and his information.
In the Fourth Amendment context, the United States Supreme Court has often
recognized the difficulty of resting law enforcement decisions with the person
responsible for zealous enforcement of the law. As the Court remarked in Horton v.
California,148 "[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application
of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer." 149 Because of this preference for objective
criteria to guide law enforcement decisions, the Fourth Amendment generally
favors a warrant before law enforcement officers conduct a search for evidence or
contraband.
The same basic principle-desire for impartial, fair and thoughtful decision
making-applies to choices made by the numerous assistant U.S. attorneys who
make most of the day-to-day decisions on how to prosecute cases, including
decisions about which cooperators to use, whether their information is valid and
credible, whether to pursue leads offered by such cooperators, and whether to relay
information obtained from a cooperator to law enforcement authorities, federal or
state. Like "a search warrant [that] 'provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than 'the
hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime, ' " 150 the federal prosecutor needs some clear
direction about how to appraise a cooperator and make an intelligent, wellinformed, logical, and just decision about whether (and, if so, how) to use a
cooperator's information. 15 1 Even understanding that most federal prosecutors

Lynn R. Singband, Note, The Hyde Amendment and ProsecutorialInvestigation: The Promise of Protectionfor
CriminalDefendants, 28 FoREDHAM URB. L.J. 1967, 1971 (2001) (describing how the broad discretion given to
federal prosecutors can result in innocent people losing their freedom).
148. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

149. Id. at 138. This quote was offered by the Court in the context of analyzing a Fourth Amendment issue in
which the Court ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the seizure of weapons discovered
in plain view during the execution of a search warrant, even when the warrant did not include such guns. Id. at

138-39.
150. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9
(1977)).
151. Having noted a need for "clear notions" and "external guidance" is not to say that developing such
concrete guides will be simple or a substitute for the individual prosecutor's sound judgment. Moreover, by
drawing a parallel between law enforcement officers who must make split-second decisions about how to comply

with the Fourth Amendment (and still uncover evidence), I do not intend to suggest that prosecutors make
decisions hurriedly or to unduly minimize the need for prosecutorial discretion in making decisions about
cooperators or any other choice important to the successful prosecution of federal crimes. Certainly, in making

charging decisions, dealing with cooperating witnesses, advising investigative agents, preparing witnesses to
testify, trial strategy and preparation, and in choosing sentences to recommend for persons who have been
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seek to "do justice,"1 52 "[d]isinterested zeal for the
public good does not assure
153
either wisdom or right in the methods it pursues."
As part of its new culture of cooperation outlined further in Part V, all federal
prosecutors should be trained and routinely reminded of the importance of dealing
wisely with every cooperator, and DOJ should emphasize and reward (financially
and through office-wide recognition) prosecutors who demonstrate an ability to
make well-informed, good-faith decisions in the best interest of "doing justice."
Such incentives will prove especially important if federal prosecutors are expected
to ensure that tips about state crimes and crimes in other districts are adequately
developed and pursued.
IV. THE FEDERAL PROSECUTOR'S SPECIFIC ETHICAL

RESPONSifiLITY To CONSIDER A

COOPERATOR'S VALID TIP

Because there is no one "right" answer to whether, when, or how a federal
prosecutor should use information she receives from a seemingly candid cooperating defendant,1 54 there might appear to be no "wrong" way for a prosecutor to
react to such defendants. That's where the logic fails. Although federal prosecutors
are spared from a legal directive to use such seemingly valuable information, the
prosecutor's ethical responsibility to "do justice" requires, at a minimum, careful
deliberation of such tips. In the context of cooperation, this ethical obligation to
"do justice" is given meaning by the potential importance of cooperation, by the
DOJ's mission "to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans,"
and by Congress's mandate for proportional and equitable sentencing.

convicted of violating the federal criminal laws, someone must exercise discretion. The oft-debated question is
whether the discretion should rest with the Executive Branch; that is, the U.S. Attorney General and concomitant
U.S. and assistant U.S. attorneys, or the Judicial Branch; that is, the sentencing judge. My point is not that the
power should shift to the Judicial Branch, but that there should be more dialogue and guidance from within the
Executive Branch about the proper exercise of the prosecutor's discretion. Once there is an effective system
within DOJ for exchanging ideas about cooperation in a way that maximizes the many benefits cooperators can
provide, prosecutors should welcome additional dialogue with the sentencing judge when appropriate and
applicable. I am content to rest the inevitable discretion with the individual prosecutor who deals with a
cooperator, perhaps because I have seen first-hand how talented and conscientious federal prosecutors tend to be.
Typically, the assistant U.S. attorney knows the most about the tipster, the tip, and its context, and is in the best
position to accurately and fairly assess its value. Nevertheless, assistant U.S. attorneys need encouragement to
remain vigilant in seeking justice in all their decisions, and they need clear notions about how they should
confront the decision-making process.
152. Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 638 (asking "what prosecutor doesn't think that he or
she is 'seeking justice?"') (quoting Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?,14 GEO J.
LEGAL Enucs 355, 379 (2001)).

153. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
154. Although not the subject of this Article, there would appear to be a single and obvious correct response to
a cooperator's seemingly invalid or manufactured tip: the prosecutor would reject it. Furthermore, if the
suggestions in Part V of this Article were adopted by DOJ, an erroneous and contrived tip would be recorded in a
database. This record would constitute part of a cooperator's potentially discoverable history as a cooperating
witness.
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A. The Duty of Careful Evaluation
While "doing justice" is an amorphous concept, in the setting of evaluating
a potential cooperator's seemingly valid lead its meaning becomes more discernable. "Doing justice" does not mean taking the easiest path1 55 or making a
random decision. It does not involve simply choosing the course that will please
the greatest number of people. Instead, prosecutors must assess the believability
of the tip and the importance and value of the cooperation, while remaining
mindful of the many interests at stake in the criminal justice system. 156 Prosecutors must evaluate their options from the viewpoint of the various constituents they serve, while asking whether the proposed course will promote the
following ideals:1 57 1) to convict a guilty perpetrator of a federal crime; 2) to
assist the states in convicting persons who violate their criminal statutes; 3) to
ensure that every perpetrator receives adequate but not disproportionate punishment; 4) to encourage cooperators to provide only truthful information; 5) to
promote and protect the interests of victims, whether they are victims of federal
or state crimes, who need to heal and hope to live without fear of further
victimization; 6) to satisfy society's need for retribution; 7) to satisfy society's
need to deter crime-both by the individual perpetrator15 8 and by other would-be
criminals; 5 9 and 8) to tailor each defendant's sentence and punishment to his
individual culpability, likelihood of rehabilitation, and other individual characteristics.1 60
These ideals reflect the potential importance of cooperation and Congress's
desire for equitable sentencing of comparable defendants. They also coincide
with the goals expressed by DOJ in its Mission Statement. In pertinent part, that
Mission requires prosecutors to "enforce the law and defend the interests of
the United States according to the law; to provide federal leadership in preventing
and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful

155. Arguably, a totally arbitrary decision would also violate a legal duty. See supranotes 108 and 124.
156. Professor Green discussed the prosecutor's multiple roles when exploring the source of the prosecutor's
special ethical obligations. See Green, supra note 90, at 633-37.
157. Id. Green describes the prosecutor's duties as including "enforcing the criminal law by convicting and
punishing some (but not all) of those who commit crimes; avoiding punishment of those who are innocent of
criminal wrongdoing; and affording the accused, and others, a lawful, fair process." Id. at 634. Two other "aims"
of doing justice, according to Green, are "to treat individuals with proportionality" and "to treat lawbreakers with
rough equality." Id.

158. Often referred to as "specific deterrence."
159. Often referred to as "general deterrence."
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (noting important factors for choosing a sentence, including, the nature
and circumstances of the offense; the history and character of the defendant; and the need for a sentence that
reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment). This tailoring
of punishment focuses on the individual characteristics of a defendant and his or her crime, whereas the desire for
proportional punishment identified as the prosecutor's third ideal is concerned with ensuring that certain groups of
defendants are not punished more harshly than other groups based on characteristics such as gender, race,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.
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behavior; ...16 1and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all
Americans."
There is no recipe or formula for prosecutors to employ in deciding when and
how cooperators will maximize justice, but by considering all the circumstances of
the situation and respecting all of the interests that may be served by a tip, the
prosecutor is in a good position to evaluate whether or not pursuing the lead will
serve these ideals. In some circumstances, justice will result from the fullest
prosecution of the potential cooperator without rewarding or encouraging cooperation. For other defendants, who express strong remorse for a less serious federal
crime, the balance of justice may well tip toward the need to pursue other crimes
162
and criminals at the expense of awarding a sentence reduction to the cooperator.
Because the prosecutor represents so many diverse interests within the criminal
justice system, she will sometimes (perhaps even often) face direct conflicts in her
representation of those interests. For instance, she may recognize that she can
serve the interests of two victims, if she acts on a tip, but that such reliance will
compromise the interests of two others who are expecting the cooperating
defendant to receive a statutorily mandated minimum sentence. "It is the prosecutor's task, in carrying out the sovereign's objectives, to resolve whatever tension
exists among them in the context of individual cases." 163 Professor Graham
Hughes has explained the balancing of interests this way: "[A] prosecutor has a
duty to neutralize the largest number of units possible of culpability and dangerousness expressed in behavior that the criminal code prohibits."' 64 Accordingly, a
prosecutor's ethical duty to "do justice" requires her to, at least, fully and carefully
consider any and all information received from a potential cooperator and evaluate
the information in light of the strong societal need to prevefit and prosecute crime,
DOJ's Mission seeking to ensure justice for all, and to further the goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.165

161. See supra note 12 (discussing the DOJ's mission statement).
162. Although he proposed the solution in the setting of civil practice, my proposed solution is akin to the
allotment of ethical discretion urged by William H. Simon. Simon, supra note 90, at 1090 (proposing that civil
lawyers "should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most
likely to promote justice").

163. Green, supra note 90, at 634.
164. Hughes, supranote 1, at 14.

165. I do not go so far as to require federal prosecutors to affirmatively prompt potential cooperators to provide
tips because in prompting a cooperator, I suspect that there is a greater likelihood that the cooperator may
manufacture information and concoct a story in hopes of pleasing the prosecutor. See Bennett Gershman, Witness
Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARiozo L. REv. 829, 833-34 (2002) (noting the vulnerability of a cooperating
witness to easy manipulation by coercive and suggestive investigative techniques); Roberts, supra note 24, at 272
(arguing that cooperators are "skilled at learning details about the case or about what information the government
wants to hear"); Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of EthicalRules Can Minimize
the Dangersof ProsecutorialLeniency and Immunity Deals, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 875, 884 (2002) ("[W]hen a

prosecutor tells a defendant or defense counsel what testimony is expected of the defendant... in order to qualify
for cooperator/leniency/immunity status, the defendant is powerfully motivated to parrot what the prosecution
wants and expects to hear").
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When dealing with cooperating defendants, a prosecutor should always consider: (1) What is the fairest and wisest course, given the interests of all of the
crime victims affected, (whether victims of federal or state crimes), including,
when appropriate, society as a victim, and the federal government as a whole?; (2)
Is it necessary to investigate, communicate, or take any action at all in response to
the tip? If so, what is the wisest course of action?; and (3) If the prosecutor does not
act, will she abuse her prosecutorial discretion by impairing society's interest in
crime resolution, DOJ's desire for "justice for all," or Congress's mandate for
parity in sentencing defendants? 166 In answering the third question, the prosecutor
should contemplate (a) Who will benefit from her actions or inactions?; (b) Who
will suffer?; (c) Will a defendant avoid punishment he should receive?; (d) Will
another defendant escape punishment altogether or receive less punishment than
he is due?; (e) Will victims of crime be victimized a second time by the justice
system itself?; (f) Which of these interests are the most important under the
circumstances and why? In forcing herself to ask and answer these questions and
evaluate her options, a prosecutor is sure to make a better choice than if she
decides intuitively or with less conscious thought.
Moreover, while prosecutors are certainly subject to influence from their own
personal interests and biases, the fact that prosecutors do not represent the interests
of a particular client, but rather owe their primary duty to the sovereign, will tend
to favor their ability to act independently and objectively, provided prosecutors are
and assuming DOJ provides adequate rewards for making sound
properly trained,
167
decisions.
One might assume that every federal prosecutor would carefully deliberate
before rejecting or accepting an offer of cooperation. Such an assumption would,
however, overlook the fact that prosecutors are human with human frailties. 168 It
would ignore the fact that many federal prosecutors, while bright and wellmeaning, lack training and experience. 169 Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky conducted
166. See Green, supra note 90 at 634 (discussing the prosecutor's duties and objectives, some of which are in
"tension" with each other); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (2002) (listing factors
pertinent to a prosecutor's decision to sponsor a substantial assistance motion for a downward departure,
including: 1) the truthfulness and completeness of the information; 2) the nature and extent of the assistance; 3)
any injury to the cooperator or his interests or family that might result from the cooperation; 4) the timeliness of
the cooperation; and 5) the relative importance of the information or testimony).
167. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a PassionatePursuit,
68 FoRiHAM L. Rev. 1695, 1697 (2000) ("The prosecutor doesn't have a client; he has a constituency. The local
prosecutor is not responsible to the state government but to the people directly."); Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra
note 7, at 340 & n.178 (making his own observations as a former prosecutor and describing those relayed by
others in the criminal justice system that prosecutors are generally better evaluators of truth than jurors).
168. See Burke, supra note 137, at 1590-91, 1614 (asserting that prosecutors sometimes fail to make decisions

that rationally further justice, "not because they fail to value justice, but because they are, in fact, irrational" and
are "biased decision makers" as human beings).
169. See Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supra note 7, at 950-51, 950 n.155 (1999) (reporting, based on interviews

with former assistant U.S. attorneys in the Southern District of New York, a finding that many federal prosecutors
lack life experiences).
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research in the Southern District of New York that found many federal prosecutors
lack life experiences and that assistant U.S. attorneys are typically hired with an
average of three years of experience from a large, top-tier law firm. 170 Assuming
careful deliberation of every tip would understate the heavy work loads prosecutors can confront, which also tend to favor a cursory consideration of tips. 17 ' It
would overlook the fact that some prosecutors focus narrowly on convicting
defendants and that such a myopic focus can unduly narrow their ability to
evaluate tips in an unbiased manner. 172 Finally, assuming thoughtful consideration
of every tip appears to contradict empirical findings that show a disparity in the
way different U.S. attorney's offices award substantial assistance departures.17 3
Reasoning logically from the empirical findings suggests that disparity in the way
different offices award substantial assistance departures is due to disparity in the
way cooperators and their information are valued, evaluated and, subsequently,
rewarded by assistant U.S. attorneys.
B. The Duty of Careful Evaluation Derives From the Responsibility to
"Do Justice"
The federal prosecutor's affirmative obligation to weigh the value of a cooperator's information in a way that maximizes the fulfillment of the goals of the DOJ
and the ideals of the federal criminal system of justice derives from the prosecu174
tor's well-established and express (albeit vague) ethical duty to "seek justice."'
Presumably, scholars would agree that a federal prosecutor acts unethically if he
pursues a cooperator's lead that he knows (or is quite sure) is concocted and
directed at assisting the government in the prosecution of another who is innocent
of a crime. While there would presumably be no legal bar to such a prosecution,
the ethical prohibition is clear. Although slightly less compelling, the prosecutor
has a complementary ethical duty to carefully evaluate a cooperator's seemingly
valid tip.

170. Id.
171. See Darryl K. Brown, CriminalProcedure,Justice, Ethics, and Zeal, 96 MCH. L. REv.2146,2148 (1998)
(noting that prosecutors and defenders work "in a world of heavy case loads").
172. Cassidy, Characterand Context, supra note 37, at 667 (asserting that widespread reliance on accomplice
bargaining leads prosecutors to view convictions as paramount to other values in the criminal justice system);
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supra note 7, at 949 (finding evidence of a "gung ho" or "true believer" mentality in
the Southern District of New York that caused these prosecutors to "target[] bad guys and then ... push the

margins to achieve a result").
173. See MAxFIELD AND KRAMER, SUBsTANTIAL AssisTANcE, supra note 8, at 20 (reporting that the evidence
compiled from the efforts of a working group who explored 5K1 .1 departures indicated an equity problem in the

way substantial assistance motions were made).
174. See also Gershman, supranote 7, at 316 (arguing that prosecutors have "both a negative duty to refrain
from conduct that impedes the search for truth and an affirmative duty to protect and promote the search for

truth"); id. at 337 (asserting that "[a]lthough not articulated in judicial decisions, a prosecutor's duty to truth
embraces a duty to make an independent evaluation of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic
evidence, and the truth of the defendant's guilt").
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Because cooperation has proven (in general) to be very important in reducing
crime and convicting guilty defendants, in this setting, justice is usually fostered
when prosecutors encourage cooperators to provide accurate information about
other wrongdoers and other crimes. Therefore, the prosecutor's ethical duty to
"seek justice" will often require a prosecutor to offer a potential cooperator the
likelihood of sentence leniency in exchange for his assistance to the government.
Vigilant, but cautious, use of cooperators will support justice because defendants'
tips have proven to be effective crime prevention tools, provided that prosecutors
guard against the manipulative cooperator.
A federal prosecutor's ethical and professional duty to carefully consider every
seemingly valid tip also rests on the federal prosecutor's role as the representative
of the government and, correspondingly, her position as protector of society's and
victims' rights. 1 75 Imposing a duty on prosecutors to carefully consider every valid
tip is consistent with Justice Sutherland's oft-cited view of the federal prosecutor's
role in the criminal justice system. As Justice Sutherland explained, the prosecutor
is the representative of
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
the
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
76
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.1
If every federal prosecutor remembers that guilt can escape prosecution entirely
and innocent victims may continue to suffer without answers, when seemingly
valid tips are inadequately pursued, prosecutors will make more thoughtful
decisions about how a tip can best serve justice. Prosecutors must also remember
that unless and until the guilty are convicted, there is always a risk that an innocent
person will be targeted for prosecution. Notwithstanding the criticism that cooperators sometimes lead to wrongful convictions, 17 7 the lack of reliance on valid leads
can also result in injustice, including prosecution of the innocent. Thus, by careful
evaluation of every tip, a federal prosecutor promotes DOJ's mission to ensure the
fair and impartial administration of justice for all.
Finally, the duty to carefully consider the value of every tip proffered by a
potential cooperating defendant will promote sentencing equity. While there is no
guarantee that individual prosecutors will treat similarly situated defendants alike
in every instance, their thoughtful efforts to apply the DOJ's standards in a careful
and thorough manner will tend to result in more uniform decisions and sentencing
parity.

175. See id. at 315 (explaining that prosecutors are special guardians of facts of the case).
176. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
177. See supranote 25 and accompanying text.
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C. Considerationof a Tip Does Not Mean Acceptance
To say that a prosecutor must fully evaluate information received (or obtainable)
from a cooperating defendant is not to say that she must accept it as valuable, rely
on it, cause the tip to be further investigated, or communicate the information to
another law enforcement source. Her duty is to "seek justice" (as articulated
above) by examining the tip and exercising her considered judgment and discretion to the best of her ability in an effort to ensure that justice is served. Not every
tip merits the expenditure of government resources, and many leads may appear
invalid, unworthy or contrived. Not every decision that a prosecutor makes will
prove, in hindsight, to be the best choice. The ethical prosecutor should not be
expected to be a clairvoyant, only engaged, thoughtful and diligent in protecting
victims' and the public's interest in a safe society.
V. SOME THOUGHTS ON

How TO ENCOURAGE PROSECUTORS TO "Do JUSTICE"
AROUND COOPERATION

Certain prosecutors already successfully impede crime through their effective
use of cooperating defendants; others are more apathetic or inconsistent in their
reliance on seemingly valid information revealed through cooperators. 178 Increasing federal prosecutors' attention to cooperation will properly recognize the
importance of such tips in preventing crimes and punishing wrongdoers and
hopefully decrease the inconsistent manner in which federal prosecutors (often in
the same office) treat and reward cooperating defendants.
A. A Culture of "DoingJustice"
In some U.S. attorneys' offices, "doing justice" is a more prominent theme than
in others. 179 Likewise, in some divisions and sections within a U.S. attorney's
office, there will be more emphasis on "justice," "fairness," "process" and "doing

178. Because prosecutors decide in secret with no reporting requirements and no personal accountability for
poor decisions, no one knows how effective or ineffective federal prosecutors are (individually or collectively) at
using and accurately assessing the value of cooperators' tips. But the inconsistent way that individual U.S.
Attorneys reward cooperators with sentence reductions tends to suggest too much disparity at the individual
prosecutor level too. See MAXFIELD AND KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL AsSISTANCE, supra note 8, at 7-9 (noting many
inconsistencies in policies on substantial assistance and limited numbers of departures awarded).
179. This observation is my own from the time I spent in the Northern and Middle districts of Georgia and the
several weeks I spent on detail in the Southern District of Florida. See also Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7,
at 350 (asserting that a prosecutor's moral courage to seek truth is "possible only in an office that encourages
prosecutors to be ministers of justice"); id. at 353 (noting that some prosecutors' offices fail to train and supervise
young prosecutors on basic norms like not to lie, while others embrace a duty to the truth); Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation, supra note 7, at 920 (indicating that within the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys Offices, there are
"significant differences in legal culture and traditions, office policies and priorities").
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the right thing" than in other factions of the same office. 180 Moreover, political
changes in high-level officials within the Executive Branch regularly result in the
appointment of new Attorneys General and different U.S. Attorneys. With such
changes, the emphasis on "doing justice" fluctuates. Some administrations, some
U.S. Attorneys, and some Criminal Division Chiefs within U.S. Attorney's Offices
favor rules, procedures, and convictions. Others favor "justice" and doing the
"right thing" in all its benevolent abstraction.1 81 In other words, the ninety-three
U.S. Attorneys1 82 act independently of one another and from "Main Justice,"
which is located and operated from Washington, D.C. Because U.S. Attorneys act
independently, they develop their own, unique culture of "doing justice," 183 which
may be unlike the culture in any of the other ninety-three offices. Furthermore,
each section or division within the ninety-four U.S. Attorney's offices may have a
unique culture.'84
B. How to Promote the "Justice" Culture
As the primary procedural solution to the ethical dilemma federal prosecutors
confront in the context of evaluating and using cooperating defendants, this Article
urges better communication-a simple but historically effective method of problem solving.

180. See Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 353 n.235 (stating that "[b]ecause prosecutor's offices are
so very different, there has been relatively little discussion over the extent to which a 'prosecutorial culture' can be
identified").
181. This Article asserts that these persons are the ones in the best position "to give meaning to a phrase that
might otherwise seem to be an entirely empty vessel." Green, supra note 90, at 618 (discussing justifications for
the duty to do justice). See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, Cooperation,supra note 7, at 961-62 (noting one prosecutor who
was taught to take minimal notes in sessions with cooperators so that the notes did not need to be produced to the
defense); Dr. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor:A Look At Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 98, 109, 116 (1975)
(recounting the experience of some prosecutors who felt restricted in their ability to do the "right" thing). See also
Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 309 (explaining that the "accepted ethos" in the office in which he once
worked as a prosecutor required that each prosecutor be personally convinced of a defendant's guilt before
pursuing a conviction).
182. While there are ninety-four U.S. attorney's offices, because an office in Guam shares a U.S.Attorney with
the Northern Mariana Islands, there is one less U.S. Attorney.
183. See Farabee, supra note 9, at 570 (finding different prosecutorial cultures in two different districts and
linking those different cultures to disparities in the manner sentencing departures were pursued). Professor Judith
L. Maute has suggested that the ethical culture within a prosecutor's office may tacitly encourage repeat violators
of prosecutorial ethics. Judith L. Maute, "In PursuitofJustice" in High Profile CriminalMatters, 70 FORDHAM L.
RE. 1745, 1750 (2002) ("Because the ethical culture within a prosecutor's offices may tacitly encourage certain
repeat violations, lawyer disciplinary agencies must be willing to act, thus providing a disincentive for deliberate
misconduct.").
184. In my experience, the prosecutors assigned to pursue drug crimes as their primary duty displayed a more
"gung ho," win-at-(almost)-all-costs mentality than did prosecutors whose primary duty was to prosecute violent
crimes, gun crimes or fraud offenses. The culture in the drug division was noticeably different than in other
sections of the office.
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1. Communication within DOJ
In frequent communication with all of the office's prosecutors, every U.S.
Attorney and her managing attorneys should emphasize the significance of wisely
using cooperation. Currently, there is a dearth of information, communication and
conversation about the process of evaluating and using cooperators equitably and
effectively. This lack of emphasis on cooperation within DOJ is inexcusable. With
modern technology, disseminating ideas about how to maximize the effectiveness
of cooperation is simple. Electronic mail messages can quickly and efficiently
relay the U.S. Attorney's expectations to every federal prosecutor in an office. The
topic of cooperation should also be a regular topic of discussion at office-wide
meetings of the criminal division attorneys, as well as at inter-office
meetings and
1 85
gatherings.
Tough decisions in which a prosecutor must employ her discretion and choose
the most desirable course of action, or (at a minimum) the least undesirable course,
"should be easier.., when prosecutors serve in an office where the 'duty to seek
justice' is fairly understood and taken seriously." 186 Assistant U.S. attorneys will
know that the duty to use cooperation is taken seriously when management within
an office and within DOJ communicates its significance. Management should
communicate this message both in words and by rewarding prosecutors who
effectively use cooperation. These rewards can be in the form of public recognition
and monetary awards, such as salary increases. Such incentives may be the only
effective means of ensuring that federal prosecutors have sufficient incentives to
give adequate attention to the important interests of society and individuals
87
victimized by state crimes over which the office lacks jurisdiction to prosecute.'
As Professor William Simon asserted in his oft-cited law review article:
In the dominant understanding, judgments about legality and justice are
grounded in the norms and practices of the surrounding legal culture. These
norms and practices are objective and systematic in the sense that they have
and are mutually meaningful to those who refer to and
observable regularity
88
engage in them.'
The message that leaders within DOJ send to assistant U.S. attorneys will create
objective and systematic norms for dealing with cooperating defendants and will
give concrete structure to the otherwise amorphous and vague term of art-"doing

185. When I was an assistant in Georgia, the three district offices met annually for continuing legal education.
Such conferences are ideal for raising awareness of the importance of cooperationt
186. Green, supra note 90, at 643.
187. Because prosecutors are in a unique position to protect the "global" interests of society, (including the
interests of the federal sovereign, the states, and victims (state or federal)), the need to motivate prosecutors is not
akin to a desire to motivate employees faced by businesses everywhere, which seek to motivate employees to
maximize profits. The interests represented by the federal prosecutor are much more diverse and complex.
188. Simon, supra note 90, at 1120.
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justice." 189 "As 'professionals,' prosecutors probably are capable of exercising
discretionary judgment in a manner consistent with [such] general norms of
behavior."'1 90 In short, leaders within the DOJ can create a culture that values
cooperation and thereby gives important meaning to the otherwise ambiguous
term. By adding meaning to the term, "do justice," leaders within the Department
can increase the likelihood that young, inexperienced and other prosecutors will
maximize the justice they do. 19 1
The importance of office culture to the way individual prosecutors pursue
sentencing departures is illustrated by an empirical study of two federal judicial
districts-the District of Connecticut and the District of Massachusetts. 192 Professor Lisa Farabee's study uncovered departure disparity between the districts and
tracked that disparity, in large part, to "dissimilar local traditions and legal
cultures."' 193 The study found that in Connecticut there existed "a prosecutorial
philosophy of rewarding only maximum cooperation by defendants. ' 194 The
assistant U.S. attorneys in Connecticut "painted a picture of a federal district with
rampant judicial independence and high standards for defendants seeking to
195
cooperate with the government."
In contrast to the District of Connecticut's philosophy on sentencing departures,
in Massachusetts, the study found evidence of a "prosecutorial culture of discretion and cooperation."' 96 In Massachusetts, where prosecutors filed large numbers
of substantial assistance motions, assistant U.S. attorneys indicated that such
motions were filed whenever "defendants agree[d] to cooperate and the targets [of
'
the cooperation] plead guilty."197
In other words, the standards imposed on
defendants who sought to earn a sentence departure for cooperating were more
easily satisfied in Massachusetts. The District of Massachusetts frequently sought
and rewarded cooperation "to pursue 'bigger fish.' ' 198 The United States Sentencing Commission has reported similar findings of disparity in the way districts
award sentence reductions for defendants' substantial assistance in the prosecution
of others. The Commission's 1999 report to the Judicial Conference indicated that

189. Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 350 (noting that "[p]rosecutors should be encouraged to
evaluate a case critically with colleagues and supervisors to decide whether a prosecution should be undertaken").
190. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,
44 VAND. L. REV.45, 48 (1991) (citing Simon, supra note 90, at 1090-1113, 1131-35).
191. See also Gershman, Duty to Truth, supra note 7, at 351 (asserting that a prosecutorial culture can
encourage prosecutors "to judge truth aggressively" or, conversely, advocate winning, which can discourage
"critical examination of truth" and encourage misconduct too).
192. See Farabee, supra note 9, at 570 (noting the "statistical discrepancy in the types of departures granted

most frequently between the District of Connecticut and the District of Massachusetts").
193. Id. at 570, 593.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 621.
Farabee, supra note 9, at 621-22.
Id. at 622.

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:67

"[a]cross districts, the roles of substantial assistance departures ranged from 1.7%
to 43.6%.

'

99

Although creating a culture of "doing justice" through encouraging discussion
among assistant U.S. attorneys and their colleagues and supervisors may seem like
an overly simplistic solution to the unanswerable question of what action to take in
response to a cooperator, such discussions have proven highly effective in other
settings. 200 As Professor Alafair S. Burke notes in her article on the affects of
cognitive bias on prosecutorial decision making, there is empirical evidence that
self awareness of cognitive limitations can improve the quality of individual
decision making.2 °1
Communicating about how to assess cooperating defendants and their information will allow DOJ and its leaders to give structure and content to factors the
Department has identified as pertinent to the inquiry, including giving meaning to
the following terms: the "trustworthiness" of the tip; the "relative importance" of
the cooperation; its "timeliness;" the "harm" that the cooperator may suffer
because of cooperation; and the "benefit" to be gained by reliance on the lead.2 °2 In
explaining such factors and discussing how prosecutors can best assess these and
other relevant factors, the Department can foster a culture of "doing justice" that
will promote cooperation, an effective crime prevention and resolution tool.
Because this Article promotes communication as a primary solution, some
might argue that I favor "doing justice" through osmosis. 20 3 After all, can talking
about doing justice really change a prosecutor's willingness and ability to "do
justice?" I strongly suspect that the answer is yes. Increasing prosecutors'
awareness (subconscious or conscious) that opportunities are lost when a cooperator's tips are dismissed too summarily and increasing concern for careful, evaluative decision-making is likely to result in a more critical and effective evaluation of
cooperation. Such discussions are far superior to the current, undirected process,
which permeates some U.S. Attorney's Offices.
The Department or individual U.S. Attorneys might impose a communication
requirement on individual prosecutors as well. Individual prosecutors could be
required to communicate every cooperator's tip to a designated prosecutor,
supervisor or committee. The designate would quickly vet the tip with the
199. SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 4; see also Ronald S. Safer
and Matthew C. Crowl, SubstantialAssistance Departures: Valuable Tool or DangerousWeapon?, 12 FED. SENT.
R. 41, 44 (1999) (observing that different U.S. Attorney's offices have different policies regarding cooperation
agreements).
200. Burke, supra note 137, at 1617 (citing RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMIGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 191 (1980)); id. at 1621 (discussing the value of a "fresh-look"
committee within a prosecutor's office to evaluate newly discovered evidence when evaluating the strength of
evidence against a criminal defendant).
201. Id. at 1617.
202. USAM 9-27.620 (2007); see also discussion supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
203. Figuratively, osmosis is "[a] gradual, often unconscious process of assimilation or absorption." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1244 (Houghton Mifflin 4th ed. 2000).
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individual prosecutor. This reporting requirement would increase the transparency
of the use of cooperation, helping to remove the secrecy, if not the inconsistency,
that currently surrounds the process. It would also encourage prosecutors
to be
2 °4
more thoughtful and reflective about their own process of assessing tips.
2. A Discussionwith Victims and the Sentencing Judge
In addition to raising every prosecutor's awareness of the potential value of a.
cooperator's tip through inter-office and intra-office discussion, DOJ should urge
its prosecutors to engage in more frank discussions with the victims of crime and,
on some occasions, with the district judges who regularly sentence cooperating
defendants. These additional discussions will act as a natural restraint on the
prosecutors' broad discretion. Such transparency of the prosecutor's process (when
such transparency does not undermine other competing law enforcement objectives), will allow victims to feel more a part of the justice system, will serve to
raise society's, defendants' and defense counsel's confidence in the work of federal
prosecutors, and will provide additional, positive pressure on prosecutors to use
their best efforts in deciding how to respond to offers of cooperation.
a. A conversation with the victims
Whether the prosecutor engages in a personal conversation with a victim or
allows her investigator to undertake that conversation, prosecutors will sometimes
benefit from their feedback. Victims have a keen interest in ensuring that
defendants are swiftly and justly prosecuted and punished. Because of their
interest, they offer a unique perspective about the benefits and detriments of
reducing one defendant's punishment to successfully prosecute another.
The Crime Victims' Right Act (CVA) passed in 200420' recognizes the need for
federal prosecutors to protect victims' rights during the prosecution and sentencing
of criminal defendants .2 6 The CVA gives federal crime victims20 7 several rights in
the process. The Act codifies the right "to be reasonably heard at any public
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, or sentencing, or any parole
proceeding[,]" the right "to confer with the attorney for the Government in the

204. Professor Natapoff has argued for a pretrial hearing process to vet the validity of tips and tipsters. See
Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable,supra note 22, at 126-29.
205. Enacted in October, 2004, the proper name of the law is the "Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy
Preston, Louama Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act." Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (codified

as 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2004)).
206. Contrast the spirit of the CVA with the description of a victim in Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and
Prosecutors:The Inevitable EthicalConflict of De Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S.Tx. L. REv. 695,
695 (2007) (stating that "the victim of a crime is relevant to a prosecutor only as a witness and as a symbol of the

threat the defendant poses to society").
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(e) (2004) (defining "crime victim" to include "a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense").
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case[,] ' ' 208 and the opportunity "to be treated with fairness and with respect.""2 9
Although the CVA limits the types of proceedings in which the rights of victims
attach and the amount of input a victim may demand in the prosecutor's decision
making process, the underlying idea of the CVA is to allow victims greater input in
the process that so directly impacts their interests.2 10
Even though the CVA increases victims' rights, it does not demand that a
prosecutor seek input from any victim on any issue directly affecting cooperation.
This Article in no way suggests that a prosecutor must consult a victim before
deciding how to respond to a cooperator's lead. But the interests of justice will
sometimes benefit from a victim's perspective. After all, ensuring that "victim[s']
participatory rights are appropriate and meaningful" 211 is a strong societal interest
that the criminal justice system is designed to serve. Just like society and the
government, individual victims are harmed by crime.2 12 Therefore, their interests
should be part of the calculus a prosecutor evaluates when deciding what action to
take on a cooperator's tip. Consulting victims will prompt prosecutors to remain
mindful of these important interests.
b. A conversation with the sentencingjudge
There is a raging debate in Congress, the courts, and the literature about the
at
proper balance of power between the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch 214
2 13 The Feeney Amendment
the sentencing stage of a federal prosecution.

208. See KATHARINE L. MANNING, NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, COMMENTARY: CRIME VIcnM' RIGHTS
(2007) (citing 150 Cong. Rec. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)) (noting that the CVA
"preserves prosecutorial discretion" by allowing victims to confer with the attorney for the government without
giving the victim the right to direct the prosecution).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2004).
210. See Kenna v. United States Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing the Crime Victims'
Rights Act as providing crime victims a voice in the criminal justice process). But see Deborah P. Kelly & Edna
Erez, Victim Participationin the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 231, 236 (Robert C. Davis et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1997) (acknowledging the argument that victim participation in sentencing is problematic because it
can erode prosecutorial control over the case).
211. Peggy Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the
President'sTask Forceon Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRm. & Crv. CoNEEmENT 21, 103 (1999).
212. See Beloof, supra note 143, at 40.
213. See, e.g., Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan Into the Fire: How Poor Women of Color and
Children Are Affected By Sentencing Guidelines and MandatoryMinimums, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 285, 307
(2007) (arguing that the increase in incarcerated rates of poor women of color is due in part to the shift from
judicial discretion to prosecutorial discretion in sentencing statutes); Ronald F Wright, Trial Distortion and the
End of Innocence in FederalCriminalJustice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 153 (2005) (describing the push and pull
between prosecutors, judges, and Congress over sentencing decisions).
214. Pub. L. No. 108-21, Title IV, 117 Stat. 650,667. The Feeney Amendment was enacted as a rider to part of
the PROTECT Act. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. It changed the federal sentencing law and, thereby,
shifted the power of judges to depart from a Guideline sentence to the prosecutor. See Wright, supra note 213, at
133 (arguing the Feeney Amendment restricted the "power of judges to depart from the presumptive guideline
sentence, except in cases where the prosecutor recommends a discount").
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appeared to shift the power balance in favor of the Executive Branch and,
correspondingly, the prosecutor. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Booker arguably shifted some of that power back to the judiciary.2 15 But no matter
how one decides the balance, justice will be furthered when an intelligent,
well-meaning prosecutor discusses the defendant's attempts at cooperation, or lack
thereof, with a knowledgeable, accomplished sentencing judge. The thought,
attention, and preparation such a meaningful conversation requires, will help
guarantee that the prosecutor has thoughtfully assessed the role of the defendant in
a fair, impartial, and just manner.
Prosecutors already engage in such discussions with judges in cases in which the
government files a "substantial assistance" motion. Notwithstanding this practice,
this Article proposes that sentencing judges insist on hearing about defendants'
attempts at cooperation during every sentencing hearing, not just those hearings in
which the prosecutor files a motion. The judge would simply add two to three
questions to her plea colloquy. The judge might ask: Did the defendant make any
attempt in this case to assist the government in the prosecution of other persons or
crimes? If the answer is yes, the judge would ask the prosecutor to describe the
extent of the defendant's efforts and inquire whether the cooperation aided (or is
expected to aid) the government. The defendant's lawyer (or in the rare pro se
case-the defendant himself) would be asked to respond to the prosecutor's
characterization of the defendant's cooperation attempts. If necessary, this portion
of the colloquy could be sealed to protect the interests of the defendant.
Although this conversation will transpire only after the prosecutor has decided
to accept, pursue, or reject a cooperator's help, the prosecutor's need to articulate
her reasoning in court, "on the record," will tend to ensure that she acts deliberately
in exercising her discretion. To the extent the sentencing judge believes the
prosecutor exercised poor judgment, the judge may rely on her post-Booker
authority to grant a sentencing departure under section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines, so
long as the mandatory statutory minimum does not prohibit such a departure.2 16 In
addition, because prosecutors routinely appear before the same district court
judges for sentencing and other hearings, the prosecutor's inherent desire not to
disappoint, or at least not to offend, the judge will urge the prosecutor to form and
exercise sound decisions. This pressure also adds to the prosecutor's incentives to
"do justice" with regard to cooperators. Finally, the additional time and resources
that the conversation requires are negligible.

215. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (finding that the mandatory nature of the federal
Guidelines rendered them unconstitutional and declaring the Guidelines "advisory," which effectively gives
sentencing judges more discretion than they possessed before Booker). For an additional discussion on the ruling
in Booker, see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
216. See discussion supra Part Il.B.2.a.ii.
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3. Communicate Informant Tips to a Databank
"[N]o process can assure one hundred percent accuracy in a prosecutor's
decision making. '21 7 Even the best-trained, well-meaning prosecutors will make
mistakes and under or over-value tips offered by cooperators. In addition, sometimes a tip will be too vague or incomplete for the prosecutor and his agents to
effectively use the information. For these reasons, and because it is clear that
federal and state law enforcement agencies need better methods of inter-agency
communication, 2 8 DOJ should develop and establish a databank for informants'
tips.
The databank should be accessible by both federal and state law enforcement
authorities. The databank should permit and encourage law enforcement officers to
input and retrieve information using the alleged perpetrator's name, the geographic
local of the crime, and the victims' identities. Access to information in such a
databank, which would be strictly guarded by firewalls and access passwords, will
enhance law enforcement's ability to obtain pertinent information in a timely way
that might otherwise go undetected and unused. Often the investigator or prosecutor who could make the greatest use of information has no means of learning that
the information exists and is available. A databank also has the added benefit of
ensuring that prosecutors (and agents) treat cooperators' tips with uniformity.
Every tip would be loaded into the databank for further consideration. Like a
conversation with victims and judges, reporting a defendant's attempts at cooperation will tend to ensure that prosecutors do not reject or overlook tips without
conscious evaluation. Furthermore, the databank will help chart trends of a
potential cooperator who concocts false information or, to the contrary, assists in
establishing a record of reliable leads.
CONCLUSION

Cooperating defendants have proven to be necessary and valuable tools in
preventing crime and prosecuting criminals. Federal prosecutors must exercise
vigilance to thoughtfully decide how best to pursue the information cooperating
defendants can provide. Such informed and good-faith judgment calls will inevitably require every prosecutor to weigh "the relative value or importance of different
rights and interests ' 2' 1 9 and decide what, if any, action to take in response to a given
tip. The DOJ and the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys can foster good decision-making
by developing a culture of "doing justice" in which every prosecutor is encouraged

217. Burke, supranote 137, at 1616.
218. See, e.g., David E. Kaplan, Monica M. Ekman & Angie C. Marek, Spies Among Us (Local U.S. police
forces carry out aggressive anti-subversive campaign), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 8, 2006, at 40 (recounting
the 9/11 Commission's findings of the government communications failures on September 11, 2005, and reporting
that a 2003 study by the DOJ found no shortage of problems in sharing information among law enforcement).
219. Simon, supra note 90, at 1092.

2008]

"DOING JUSTICE"

THROUGH OSMOSIS

113

and rewarded for making deliberate, good-faith, well-informed, and well-reasoned
decisions about the use of potential cooperation. Encouraging a culture of
cooperation will enhance every federal prosecutor's ability to "do justice."

